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THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE:  
THE ENDGAME—FROM SOUTHERN PACIFIC TO 
TENNESSEE WINE & SPIRITS—1945 to 2019 
 
James M. McGoldrick, Jr.* 
 
Abstract 
 
This article attempts to develop the undue burden balancing and 
the virtually per se discrimination tests of the modern Dormant 
Commerce Clause starting with the 1945 case of Southern Pacific 
v. Arizona1 and moving to Tennessee Wine & Spirits Retailers 
Ass’n v. Thomas,2 a case decided by the United States Supreme 
Court in June of 2019.  The Commerce Clause, Article I, Section 
8, Clause 3 gives Congress the power “To regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the 
Indian Tribes.”3  Our most famous Chief Justice of the United 
States Supreme Court, John Marshall, defined Congress’s 
commerce power “among the several states” to be plenary and 
complete, setting the stage for Congress to use this power over 
interstate commerce as the basis for much of Congress’ power to 
pass legislation.  Out of this immense federal power, Chief Justice 
Marshall deduced that since Congress had plenary power over 
interstate commerce, the states had none.  Only Congress could 
regulate interstate commerce. Marshall called the implied 
limitations of the Commerce Clause “dormant” leading to what 
we now call the Dormant Commerce Clause. 
There are two main aspects to the modern Dormant 
Commerce Clause.  First, states may pass evenhanded laws that 
impact interstate commerce, but even evenhanded laws may not 
impose undue burdens on interstate commerce.  Second, states 
may not discriminate against interstate commerce by treating 
commerce from other states differently than in-state commerce 
simply because it is out of state.  Under the undue burdens test, 
the Court will consider a number of factors, but primarily the 
 
* Professor of Law, Pepperdine University Rick J. Caruso School of Law.  
1. S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).  
2. Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449 (2019). 
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
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Court will undertake a factual evaluation of the importance of 
the state interest in passing the law that impacted interstate 
commerce versus a practical consideration of the harm to 
interstate commerce. Under the discrimination rule, the Court 
will almost certainly find the discriminatory state law to violate 
the Dormant Commerce Clause, but the Court uses an almost 
tortuous series of approaches to reach what is close to a foregone 
conclusion. This tortious approach has led some to say that it is 
impossible to know which of the two tests to apply.  This article 
attempts to identify the key factors involved in the Court’s undue 
burdens balancing approach and to closely explore the Court’s 
attempt to define discrimination and to determine when a state 
might be allowed to discriminate against interstate commerce.  
The hope is that at the very least students, lawyers, and lower 
courts might have some guidance in applying the two tests and 
in knowing the difference between the two. 
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I. Introduction, a brief history of the  
Dormant Commerce Clause 
 
Chief Justice Marshall first recognized the doctrine that is 
commonly called the Dormant Commerce Clause4 in Gibbons v. 
Ogden5 in 1824.  Five years later, Chief Justice Marshall gave 
the doctrine its name in Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co.6  
Its legitimacy has been argued about ever since.7 
 
4. The Dormant Commerce Clause is also referred to as the “negative” 
Commerce Clause. Alliant Energy Corp. v. Bie, 330 F.3d 904, 911 (7th Cir. 
2003) (“This ‘negative’ aspect of the Commerce Clause is often referred to as 
the ‘Dormant Commerce Clause’ and is invoked to invalidate overreaching 
provisions of state regulation of commerce.”). Although some justices prefer the 
term “negative” Commerce Clause, e.g., the Supreme Court uses the terms 
“negative” and “dormant” interchangeably. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. 
v. Town of Harrison, Me., 520 U.S. 564, 609 n.1 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
See Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Mich. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 504 U.S. 
353, 359 (1992).   
5. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824). 
6. Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. 245 (1829).  
7. In Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 46 U.S. 504, 579 (1847), Chief Justice 
Taney was one of the early critics; “[I]t appears to me to be very clear, that the 
mere grant of power to the general government cannot, upon any just 
principles of construction, be construed to be an absolute prohibition to the 
exercise of any power over the same subject by the States.”  Norman R. 
Williams, Why Congress May Not “Overrule” the Dormant Commerce Clause, 
53 UCLA L. REV. 153, 163 (2005) (“Justices Scalia and Thomas have been 
among the most strident critics of the Dormant Commerce Clause, questioning 
its very legitimacy.”). For a forceful defense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 
see Justice Alito’s opinion in Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 
139 S. Ct. 2449, 2460 (2019) (“But the proposition that the Commerce Clause 
by its own force restricts state protectionism is deeply rooted in our case law. 
And without the dormant Commerce Clause, we would be left with a 
constitutional scheme that those who framed and ratified the Constitution 
would surely find surprising.”). See the opening sentence to Professor Chen’s 
article, reading “The Supreme Court’s dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, a 
body of jurisprudence as deep as it is despised, provides the strongest 
constitutional bulwark against hostile state regulation and taxation of the 
national economy.”  Jim Chen, A Vision Softly Creeping: Congressional 
3
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In Gibbons, Chief Justice Marshall was primarily concerned 
with the scope of Congress’ commerce power over interstate 
commerce8 and recognized an expansive view of Congress’ 
commerce power.  The constitutional grant of plenary power to 
Congress to regulate interstate commerce has been argued to 
suggest that state and local governments9 cannot regulate 
interstate commerce.  The “great force” of this argument initially 
captured Chief Justice Marshall,10 but eventually, he punted on 
the issue.  Chief Justice Marshall held that under the 
Supremacy Clause,11 federal law preempts state law.12  The 
 
Acquiescence and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1764, 1764 
(2004) (I appreciate that Professor Chen could not resist the temptation, as he 
acknowledges, to quote from Simon and Garfunkel’s “The Sounds of Silence” 
in his article’s title). Professor McGreal, having fun mixing his metaphors, 
compares the Dormant Commerce Clause with “the sound of a tree falling in a 
deserted forest,” wondering if it really exists, or if it is perhaps “like people who 
claim to have seen UFOs,” or “like a colorless, odorless toxic gas; a silent killer 
of state laws affecting interstate commerce.”  Paul E. McGreal, The Flawed 
Economics of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1191, 
1191 (1998).  
8. The Commerce Clause gives Congress the power “[t]o regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the 
Indian Tribes.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  There is almost no significant 
difference in the Dormant Commerce Clause issues between commerce “among 
the several states,” what is generally called interstate commerce, and foreign 
commerce. 
9. The Dormant Commerce Clause rules apply to both state laws and the 
political subdivisions of states, including the laws of cities and counties.  See, 
e.g., Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Mich. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 504 U.S. 
353, 361 (“[O]ur prior cases teach that a State (or one of its political 
subdivisions) may not avoid the strictures of the Commerce Clause by 
curtailing the movement of articles of commerce through subdivisions of the 
State, rather than through the State itself.”).   
10. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 209 (“There is great force in this argument, and 
the Court is not satisfied that it has been refuted.”).  
11. See generally Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225 (2000) 
(discussing thoroughly the Supremacy Clause and the doctrine of preemption). 
Kudos to Professor Nelson for resisting the temptation to use a catchy title to 
his thoughtful article. Professor Nelson paraphrases the Supremacy Clause, 
“The Clause declares that the Constitution, treaties, and valid federal statutes 
‘shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be 
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the 
Contrary notwithstanding.’”  Id. at 245. Professor Nelson gets to the nutshell 
of the Supremacy Clause in a single sentence, “Under the Supremacy Clause, 
then, the test for preemption is simple: Courts are required to disregard state 
law if, but only if, it contradicts a rule validly established by federal law.” Id. 
at 260.  
12. Marshall construed the Federal Coastal Act of 1793, though not by 
name, as granting Gibbons a federal license to operate in interstate waters, 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss1/2
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Supremacy Clause makes invalid state and local laws that 
conflict with federal laws.13  In deciding Gibbons, it was 
unnecessary to determine whether the constitutional grant of 
commerce power to Congress by itself meant that states could 
not regulate interstate commerce.  The Dormant Commerce 
Clause involves a conflict between state laws and the implicit 
limitations of the Constitution’s grant of commerce power to 
Congress.  Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, no federal 
laws are required. 
The Dormant Commerce Clause issue was also raised in 
Black Bird Creek, but was quickly dismissed by Chief Justice 
Marshall.  In Black Bird Creek, a sloop negligently ran into a 
dam across an interstate tributary called Black Bird Creek.14  In 
their defense, the sloop company argued that the state of 
Delaware’s approval of the dam was contrary to the Dormant 
Commerce Clause.15  Chief Justice Marshall would have none of 
it, stating that: 
 
We do not think that the act empowering                         
the Black Bird Creek Marsh Company to place a 
dam across the creek, can, under all the 
circumstances of the case, be considered as 
repugnant to the power to regulate commerce in 
its dormant state, or as being in conflict with any 
law passed on the subject.16 
 
In short, the state had the police powers to build the dam, 
and it did not conflict with the Dormant Commerce Clause or the 
Supremacy Clause. 
Although Marshall recognized the Dormant Commerce 
Clause in dicta in Gibbons, and named it in Willson,17 the 
 
which preempted the state law that had given Ogden a monopoly in steamboat 
traffic between New York and New Jersey.  Gibbons, 22 U.S. 1.   
13. Id.  
14. Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. 245, 251 (1892). 
15. Id. at 250.  
16. Id. at 252 (emphasis added). 
17. Chief Justice Marshall used the Dormant Commerce Clause as an 
alternative ground for his decision in Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. 419 (1827), 
but Brown’s primary holding was that Maryland’s license fee for importation 
of alcoholic beverages from foreign countries violated the Import-Export 
Clause of Article I, Section 10 of the United States Constitution. 
5
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doctrine did not come into its own until Cooley v. Board of 
Wardens18 in 1851.  In Cooley, the state of Pennsylvania required 
that all larger vessels, including Cooley’s interstate barges, 
entering the port of Philadelphia had to take on a Philadelphia-
based pilot to guide the vessel into port.19  Cooley claimed that 
this law regulated interstate commerce in a way contrary to 
what was considered to be Gibbon’s dicta that states could not 
regulate interstate commerce.20  The Cooley Court accepted the 
legitimacy of the Dormant Commerce Clause, but it rejected 
Gibbon’s zero sum theory of commerce power, that any state 
regulation subtracted from Congress’ plenary power to regulate 
interstate commerce.21  Rather, Cooley said, some subjects in 
interstate commerce needed uniformity of regulation, and as for 
those subjects needing uniformity, only Congress can regulate.22  
Other subjects in interstate commerce needed diversity of 
regulation.  As for those subjects needing diversity, both the 
states and the federal government had concurrent power.  
Unless some specific federal law preempted the state law, the 
states could regulate subjects of interstate commerce needing 
diversity of regulation.23  Since it was unlikely that Congress 
would have the interest or the knowledge to regulate the 
peculiarities of the various ports in the United States, 
navigation safety rules as to ports was a subject needing 
diversity of regulation best left to state regulation absent federal 
legislation.24 
 
18. Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens 53 U.S. 299 (1851).  
19. Id. at 311–12. 
20. Id. at 314. 
21. Id. at 315–16. 
22. Id. at 316–21. 
23. Id. at 319.   
 
Now the power to regulate commerce, embraces a vast field, 
containing not only many, but exceedingly various subjects, 
quite unlike in their nature; some imperatively demanding a 
single uniform rule, operating equally on the commerce of the 
United States in every port; and some, like the subject now 
in question, as imperatively demanding that diversity, which 
alone can meet the local necessities of navigation.   
 
24. In Cooley, a federal law passed in 1789 had authorized state 
regulation of pilotage. Id. at 317. This federal regulation would have been 
unconstitutional if Marshall’s dicta—that the Constitution by itself prevented 
state regulation of interstate commerce—had been correct. Cooley’s holding 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss1/2
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After Cooley, the Court spent almost one hundred years 
attempting to reconcile the absolute prohibition of Gibbons with 
the selective exclusivity approach of Cooley.25  The Court in 
Southern Pacific v. Arizona,26 after summarizing the historical 
origins of the Dormant Commerce Clause from Gibbons to 
Cooley, had little doubt about the Court’s crucial role in 
protecting interstate commerce, stating that: 
 
For a hundred years it has been accepted 
constitutional doctrine that the commerce clause, 
without the aid of Congressional legislation, thus 
affords some protection from state legislation 
inimical to the national commerce, and that in 
such cases, where Congress has not acted, this 
Court, and not the state legislature, is under the 
commerce clause the final arbiter of the competing 
demands of state and national interests.27 
 
that not all state regulations of interstate commerce violated the Dormant 
Commerce Clause meant that the federal law was not unconstitutional. Id. 
Later, the Court developed the fiction that the Court in Dormant Commerce 
Clause cases was interpreting Congressional silence, not the Constitution.  
Therefore, Congress can override that silence, meaning that Congress can 
permit state regulations of interstate commerce that would otherwise have 
violated the Dormant Commerce Clause. Professor Chen summarizes this 
power: “One of the most distinctive characteristics of 
the dormant Commerce Clause as constitutional doctrine is Congress’s 
virtually limitless ability to override the Supreme Court.” Chen, supra note 7, 
at 1773.  Professor Williams disagrees with the doctrine, stating that: 
 
The Court’s willingness to allow Congress to overrule 
the Dormant Commerce Clause’s limitation on state 
authority is fundamentally inconsistent with the Court’s 
declared view that Congress may not authorize the states to 
violate the Constitution. That is bad enough, but, even worse, 
the Court has failed to provide a cogent explanation for this 
anomalous exception. 
 
Norman, supra note 7, at 156. 
25. James M. McGoldrick, The Dormant Commerce Clause:  The Origin 
Story and the “Considerable Uncertainties”—1824 to 1945, CREIGHTON L. REV. 
(forthcoming).   
26. S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945). 
27. Id. at 769. The importance of the Dormant Commerce Clause in this 
regard is hard to overstate.  John J. Dinan, The Rehnquist Court’s Federalism 
Decisions in Perspective, 15 J.L. & POL. 127, 181 (1999) (“In fact, throughout 
the history of the Court the Dormant (or Negative) Commerce Clause has 
7
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In 2018, the Court in South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc. referred 
to the “considerable uncertainties” in the further development of 
the Dormant Commerce Clause after Cooley.28  Despite the 
historical uncertainties, the Wayfair Court summarized the 
modern precedents as involving two distinct approaches: 
 
First, state regulations may not discriminate 
against interstate commerce; and second, States 
may not impose undue burdens on interstate 
commerce. State laws that discriminate against 
interstate commerce face “a virtually per se rule of 
invalidity.” State laws that “regulat[e] even-
handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public 
interest . . . will be upheld unless the burden 
imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in 
relation to the putative local benefits.29  
 
Despite the seeming simplicity of these two distinct tests—
an undue burden balancing approach and a virtually per se 
discrimination approach—the modern test is anything but 
simple.30  This article will first discuss undue burdens, and then 
the virtually per se rule against discrimination.31 
 
proved to be one of the most prolific sources of invalidation of state laws.”).  
28. South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018) (reversing the 
Court’s long-held view that states could not impose sales or use taxes under 
the Dormant Commerce Clause on out of state companies that did not have a 
physical presence within the state). 
29. Id. at 2091 (citations omitted). The Wayfair Court cited Pike v. Bruce 
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970), for this quotation, but the Court had a 
“see also” reference to Southern Pacific v. Arizona.   
30. Brannon P. Denning, Reconstructing the Dormant Commerce Clause 
Doctrine, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 417, 422 (2008) (“These [Dormant Commerce 
Clause] rules are easy to recite, but their application is notoriously difficult, 
resulting in cases with similar facts being decided differently, and the different 
outcomes justified on the basis of tendentious distinctions.”).   
31. This article does not attempt to address the Dormant Commerce 
Clause cases involving state taxation of interstate commerce, which except for 
the rule against discrimination have their own unique approaches. This 
article’s focus is on how the undue burdens and the discrimination tests work, 
but it is also important to note at least summarily that there are two major 
exceptions to both aspects of the limitations of the Dormant Commerce Clause.  
First, Congress can always use its commerce power to permit the states to 
regulate interstate commerce in a way that would otherwise be in violation of 
the Dormant Commerce Clause. Congress has plenary power to regulate 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss1/2
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II. The beginnings of the undue burdens balancing test and the 
rejection of the rational basis test 
 
This article dates the modern undue or unreasonable 
burdens balancing test established in Southern Pacific v. 
 
interstate commerce, which includes permitting the states to regulate 
interstate commerce within the Dormant Commerce Clause limits. White v. 
Mass. Council of Const. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 213 (1983) (“Congress, 
unlike a state legislature authorizing similar expenditures, is not limited by 
any negative implications of the Commerce Clause in the exercise of its 
spending power. Where state or local government action is specifically 
authorized by Congress, it is not subject to the Commerce Clause even if it 
interferes with interstate commerce.”). Owner Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n, 
Inc. v. Pa. Tpk. Comm’n, 383 F. Supp. 3d 353, 368 (M.D. Pa. 2019) (citations 
omitted) (quotation marks omitted) (one district court’s summary) 
 
[T]he Supreme Court has recognized that where state or local 
government action is specifically authorized by Congress, it 
is not subject to the [dormant] Commerce Clause even if it 
interferes with interstate commerce.  In making such an 
authorization, Congress must manifest its unambiguous 
intent.  Stated differently, congressional intent and policy to 
sustain state legislation from attack under the Commerce 
Clause must be expressly stated. 
 
Second, under the so-called market participant exception, states can impose 
undue or discriminatory burdens upon interstate commerce if the state is 
acting as a market participant, similar to a private business, and not as a 
regulator.  In the first such case, Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 
794 (1976), the state of Maryland paid a modest bounty to scrap processors of 
abandoned hulks of automobiles, but through a discriminatory process that 
made it far easier for scrap processors in Maryland to claim the bounty than 
those in neighboring states such as Virginia. The Court reasoned that 
Maryland was not interfering “[W]ith the natural functioning of the interstate 
market either through prohibition or through burdensome regulation” but that 
Maryland “[H]as entered into the market itself to bid up their price.” Id. at 806.  
And in a nutshell, the Court explained its logic “Nothing in the purposes 
animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a State, in the absence of 
congressional action, from participating in the market and exercising the right 
to favor its own citizens over others.” Id. at 810. The Court applied the logic to 
the state as buyer in Hughes, to the state as seller in Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 
U.S. 429 (1980), and to the state as employer in White v. Massachusetts 
Council of Const. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204 (1983). The Court seems to 
have expanded the doctrine in United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer 
Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330 (2007) (allowing the state to 
discriminate in favor of local processors of waste) and in Dep’t of Revenue of 
Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328 (2008) (permitting the state to exempt bonds issued 
by the state from state income taxes, but not other states).  The use of state 
subsidies, such as in New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 274 
(1988), might also be viewed as a form of the state as a market participant. 
9
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Arizona in 1945.32  This is not a foregone conclusion,33 but it is 
hardly a controversial choice.34  Other cases prior to Southern 
 
32. S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).  The Court uses “undue” 
burdens and “unreasonable” burdens interchangeably.  See e.g., Colorado v. 
United States, 271 U.S. 153, 162–63 (1926).  
33. Justice Scalia, for one, dates the modern balancing test from Pike v. 
Bruce Church, “I would therefore abandon the ‘balancing’ approach to these 
negative Commerce Clause cases, first explicitly adopted 18 years ago in Pike 
v. Bruce Church, Inc., and leave essentially legislative judgments to the 
Congress.” Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enter.’s, Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 
(1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted). Professor Denning, referring 
to Southern Pacific, says, “Twenty-five years later, the Court decided Pike v. 
Bruce Church, Inc. in which the Court confirmed that Chief Justice Stone’s 
balancing approach had endured, and gave it a new name—
‘Pike balancing.’”  Denning, supra note 30, at 447. Pike itself specifically cites 
Southern Pacific as applying “a balancing approach.” Pike v. Bruce Church, 
Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). Pike has certainly won the branding battle over 
Southern Pacific. Not a single court case refers to “Southern Pacific balancing” 
while over three hundred court cases refer to “Pike balancing,” including four 
Supreme Court cases. See Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 353 
(2008); United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. 
Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 348, (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring); Camps 
Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, Me., 520 U.S. 564, 608 (1997) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 763 
(1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Oregon Waste Sys. Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. 
Quality of State of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 100 (1994). Pike seems to be the more 
modern test in that the Pike Court referred to both the undue burdens test and 
the virtually per se rule against discrimination. Catherine Gage O’Grady, 
Targeting State Protectionism Instead of Interstate Discrimination Under the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 571, 573 (1997) (“Although 
Pike v. Bruce Church is most frequently cited for defining and embracing a 
balancing test in dormant Commerce Clause review, this article will show that 
Pike is also responsible for the emergence of a discrimination-focused 
analysis.”). Southern Pacific mentioned only the undue burdens approach 
because, unlike Pike, there was no evidence of discrimination. Professor 
Aleinikoff gives Southern Pacific credit for introducing balancing to the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, but Pike credit for popularizing it. “Justice Stone 
introduced balancing to the dormant commerce clause cases [in Southern 
Pacific]. Since the 1970s, the Court has increasingly relied on a balancing test 
to decide whether state regulations impose an ‘undue burden’ on interstate 
commerce. The classic formulation is Justice Stewart’s in Pike v. Bruce 
Church, Inc.” T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of 
Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 966 (1987).  
34. Professor Regan refuses to give a precise date for the beginning of the 
modern test, “The modern era is defined by the abandonment of the 
‘direct/indirect burdens’ test and therefore cannot be given a precise beginning 
date.” Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making 
Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1093–94 
(1986).  But he calls Southern Pacific a “new balancing approach.” Id. at 1094.  
Professor Denning refers to “the paradigmatic balancing opinion in S. Pac. Co. 
v. Arizona.” Denning, supra note 30, at 445–46 (Professor Denning is to be 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss1/2
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Pacific had referred to unreasonable or undue burdens,35 but 
only Southern Pacific adopted a complete balancing test.36 
 
congratulated for apparently being able to use his Internet word-of-the-day.)  
[Note to reader: “Paradigmatic” means the same as “classic.”  See generally T. 
Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 
943, 966 (1987).].  See also W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 193 
(1994) (the Court calling the protective tariff or customs duty 
“the paradigmatic example of a law discriminating against interstate 
commerce.”). 
35. The first Supreme Court case to refer to undue or unreasonable 
burdens—in an enumerated powers case—was Colorado v. United States, 271 
U.S. 153 (1926). The Court found that the Interstate Commerce Commission 
(ICC) had the authority to deny a certificate of operations to the intrastate 
portion of a Pennsylvania railroad because of its impact on the interstate 
aspects of the railroad.  The Court said, “The certificate issues not primarily to 
protect the railroad, but to protect interstate commerce from undue burdens or 
discrimination.” Id. at 162 (emphasis added).  Subsequently, it used the phrase 
“unreasonable burdens” to make the same point, “Control [by the ICC] is 
exerted over intrastate commerce only because such control is a necessary 
incident of freeing interstate commerce from the unreasonable burdens, 
obstructions or unjust discrimination which is found to result from operating a 
branch at a large loss.” Id. at 163 (emphasis added). In 1930, in a case involving 
the scope of federal enumerated powers, Congress had used the phrase “undue 
burdens” in a 1925 Joint Resolution, 49 USCA s 55, directing the ICC to 
investigate intrastate rate regulations that might impose “undue burdens” on 
interstate commerce. Bd. of R.R. Comm’rs of State of N. Dakota v. Great N. Ry. 
Co., 281 U.S. 412, 418 n.1 (1930).  
36. Prior to Southern Pacific, the Court often applied a mechanical test 
whereby it found that there was no violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause 
because interstate commerce had not yet begun or because any burden was 
indirect as opposed to direct.  In one of its more famous cases, Coe v. Errol, 116 
U.S. 517 (1886), the town of Errol, New Hampshire placed an ad valorem 
property tax on property within the city, including logs floating on the 
Androscoggin River in Errol waiting for the spring thaw to be floated interstate 
to Lewiston, Maine.  The Supreme Court rejected a Dormant Commerce Clause 
challenge to the tax on the grounds that commerce did not begin until 
committed to an interstate carrier or until the journey actually began.  In Kidd 
v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 20 (1888), the Court upheld Iowa’s ban on in-state 
manufacturing of alcoholic beverages because manufacturing was not 
commerce.  Even in cases where interstate commerce was involved, the Court 
was more likely to refer to direct versus indirect burdens on interstate 
commerce.  Pa. Gas Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n., 252 U.S. 23, 29 (1920) 
(emphasis added) (citations deleted) (disapproved of by E. Ohio Gas Co. v. Tax 
Comm’n of Ohio, 283 U.S. 465 (1931)) (“The general principle is well 
established and often asserted in the decisions of this court that the state may 
not directly regulate or burden interstate commerce.”  But, the Court said, 
states were not excluded from regulating all subjects of interstate commerce, 
“In dealing with interstate commerce it is not in some instances regarded as 
an infringement upon the authority delegated to Congress, to permit the states 
to pass laws indirectly affecting such commerce, when needed to protect or 
regulate matters of local interest.”).  Justice Stone dissented from the 
application of the direct indirect test, “In thus making use of the expressions, 
11
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In part, Southern Pacific is the beginning of the modern test 
because of the fork in the road that the Southern Pacific Court 
did not take.  In 1938, the Court in South Carolina v. Barnwell 
Brothers37 an opinion authored by Justice Stone, who also wrote 
the Southern Pacific opinion, took a different path than the 
balancing test of Southern Pacific or the earlier direct/indirect 
test.  The fact that Justice Stone did not follow the Barnwell 
Brothers’ path in Southern Pacific is crucial in the development 
of the balancing test.  The Court in Barnwell Brothers applied a 
rational basis test to uphold a South Carolina regulation on 
truck sizes against a Dormant Commerce Clause challenge.  The 
rational basis test assumes the validity of a law,38 and is very 
different from the practical kind of balancing the Court applied 
in Southern Pacific. 
In Barnwell Brothers, South Carolina limited trucks, 
including interstate trucks, to ninety inches in width and 20,000 
pounds in total weight.39  The lower federal Court found that 
South Carolina’s law imposed an unreasonable burden on 
interstate commerce.40  It based this decision on a practical 
 
‘direct’ and ‘indirect interference’ with commerce, we are doing little more than 
using labels to describe a result rather than any trustworthy formula by which 
it is reached.”  Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 44 (1927) overruled in 
part by California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109 (1941).  Even in instances in 
which the Court applied some aspects of modern balancing, it also relied on 
this mechanical approach.  Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 361 (1943) (the 
Court upheld a California raisin marketing scheme that led to higher 
interstate prices for raisins) (“All of these cases proceed on the ground that the 
taxation or regulation involved, however drastically it may affect interstate 
commerce, is nevertheless not prohibited by the Commerce Clause where the 
regulation is imposed before any operation of interstate commerce occurs.”).  
37. S.C. State Highway Dep’t v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938). 
38. James M. McGoldrick, Jr., The Rational Basis Test and Why It Is So 
Irrational: An Eighty-Year Retrospective, 55 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 751, 768–69 
(2018) (“In determining whether an end is legitimate in rational basis cases, 
the Court will pick a conceivable end that best matches with the law; it will 
not feel bound to consider the actual end of the law. . . . And under 
the rational basis test, facts in support of the law were to be presumed, even if 
only in the legislature’s mind.”). 
39. S.C. State Highway Dep’t, 303 U.S. 177 at 183. 
40. The lower federal court in S.C. State Highway Dep’t, 303 U.S. 177, 
discussed below, applied an unreasonable burdens approach. See Barnwell 
Bros. v. S.C. State Highway Dep’t, 17 F. Supp. 803, 809 (E.D.S.C. 1937), 
rev’d, 303 U.S. 177 (1938) (citations omitted) (emphasis added) (“We come, 
then, to the third ground of attack upon the statutory regulations complained 
of, viz., that they constitute an unreasonable burden upon interstate 
commerce; and we think that the contention of plaintiffs as to this must be 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss1/2
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evaluation of the facts.  It found that eighty-five percent of the 
trucks designed for long-distance hauling were ninety-six inches 
in width and that South Carolina was the only state to impose a 
ninety-inch limit.41  It also determined that total weight was 
irrelevant and that only wheel or axle weight was important, 
representing the amount of weight that actually transferred to 
the ground.42  Justice Stone rejected the practical findings of the 
lower court, instead concluding that the state law was not 
without a rational basis; “Hence, in reviewing the present 
determination, we examine the record, not to see whether the 
findings of the court below are supported by evidence, but to 
ascertain upon the whole record whether it is possible to say that 
the legislative choice is without rational basis.”43 
Justice Stone’s use of a rational basis test in Barnwell 
Brothers, was likely the result of United States v. Carolene 
Products having been placed on the Supreme Court’s docket in 
1938.44  In 1937, the Court rejected a laissez-faire approach to 
due process limits on the right to contract, stating that “Liberty 
under the Constitution is thus necessarily subject to the 
restraints of due process, and regulation which is reasonable in 
relation to its subject and is adopted in the interests of the 
community is due process.”45  The following year, Carolene 
Products adopted the rational basis test in a case where a federal 
law banned the interstate shipment of substitutes for dairy 
products. The federal law was challenged as being in violation of 
the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.  Justice Stone 
in Carolene Products stated that “[R]egulatory legislation 
affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be 
pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts 
made known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to 
 
sustained [as to all but a few miles of substandard roads and a few narrow 
bridges.]”) .  
41. Barnwell Bros., 17 F. Supp. at 811, decree rev’d, 303 U.S. 177 (1938). 
42. Id. at 810.  An easy illustration of this weight transfer would be how 
much a small dog or cat can hurt as it transfers its entire weight on one paw 
as it marches across one’s chest to get to another position on the couch.   
43. S.C. State Highway Dep’t, 303 U.S. at 191–92 (emphasis added). 
44. United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).  
45. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937).  Earl M. 
Maltz, The Impact of the Constitutional Revolution of 1937 on the Dormant 
Commerce Clause-A Case Study in the Decline of State Autonomy, 19 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 121 (1995) (Professor Maltz calls 1937 “the beginning of the 
modern era of constitutional jurisprudence.”).  
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preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis 
within the knowledge and experience of the legislators.”46 
Justice Stone’s use of the rational basis test in Barnwell 
Brothers was in contrast with his earlier position.  In the 1927 
dissent of Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, Justice Stone argued for a 
type of balancing test for Dormant Commerce Clause issues, 
which he called “[A] consideration of all the facts and 
circumstances, such as the nature of the regulation, its function, 
the character of the business involved and the actual effect on 
the flow of commerce.”47  Why just ten years later would he argue 
for a rational basis test?  In 1937, the Court rejected a laissez-
faire approach to regulation of businesses, adopted a rational 
basis test in 1938, and Justice Stone must have been conflicted.  
Carolene Products was decided on April 25, 1938, just six weeks 
after Barnwell Brothers, and it is easy to believe that the Court’s 
rejection of strict due process clause limits in 1937 and the 
adoption of the rational basis test in 1938 was a course 
correction for Justice Stone and influenced his opinion in 
Arizona v. Southern Pacific.48 
To be clear, the rational basis test is the wrong test for the 
Dormant Commerce Clause.49  Although Barnwell Brothers has 
never been reversed, no Supreme Court case prior to Barnwell 
Brothers, and only one decided after Barnwell Brothers,50 has 
applied the rational basis test to resolve a Dormant Commerce 
Clause issue.51  Barnwell Brothers is an outlier in its use of the 
 
46. Carolene, 304 U.S. at 152 (emphasis added). 
47. Di Santo v. Commonwealth of Pa., 273 U.S. 34, 44 (1927) (the majority 
in Di Santo applied a direct/indirect test). 
48. Barnwell Brothers was cited a number of times in Southern Pacific, 
but never for its use of the rational basis test.   
49. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 476, n.2 (1981) 
(Powell, J., concurring) (“Commerce Clause analysis differs from analysis 
under the ‘rational basis’ test. Under the Commerce Clause, a court is 
empowered to disregard a legislature’s statement of purpose if it considers it a 
pretext.”). But see Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Jim’s Motorcycle, Inc., 401 
F.3d 560, 569 (4th Cir. 2005) (“Thus, we consider whether the legislature had 
a rational basis for believing there was a legitimate purpose that would be 
advanced by the statute.”).  
50. See Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583, 594 (1939) (applying the 
rational basis test in upholding a seven dollars and fifty cents state fee on 
automobiles brought into California for sale). 
51. E.g., In Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978), the 
state of Wisconsin relied on Barnwell.  The Court easily rejected the state’s 
defense. The state did not attempt to show that a law limiting the length of 
14https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss1/2
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rational basis test because the rational basis test is 
fundamentally unsuited to resolve Dormant Commerce Clause 
issues.  Under the rational basis test used in due process and 
equal protection cases,52 the Court will uphold any law if there 
is a conceivable basis for it.  The Court assumes that the political 
process within the state will be used to correct any abuses.53  For 
Dormant Commerce Clause issues, the conflict between state 
interests and harm to interstate commerce cannot be left to 
individual states.  The Court makes this clear in Southern 
Pacific; “[T]his Court, and not the state legislature, is under the 
commerce clause the final arbiter of the competing demands of 
state and national interests.”54 
 
trucks to fifty-five feet, the length of a single trailer, when the typical limit for 
interstate trucks was sixty-five feet, the length of double trailers, was justified 
by some state safety interest—”The State, for reasons unexplained, made no 
effort to contradict this evidence of comparative safety with evidence of its 
own.” Id. at 437. Instead, the state simply claimed “that Barnwell 
Bros. applied a rational relation test rather than a balancing test, and argues 
that its regulations bear a rational relation to highway safety: Longer trucks 
take longer to pass or be passed than shorter trucks.” Id. at 442–43 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  The Court found “that the challenged regulations 
unconstitutionally burden interstate commerce.”  Id. at 444.  As to the failure 
of the State to offer some practical evidence as to the safety needs of its law, 
the Court was not kind, “The State, for its part, virtually defaulted in 
its defense of the regulations as a safety measure.”  Id.  To be fair to the 
attorneys for Wisconsin, it is not clear that any argument would have sufficed.  
As to essentially the same truck length limits, Iowa’s “more serious effort to 
support the safety rationale of its law” in Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp. 
of Del., 450 U.S. 662, 671 (1981), led to the same conclusion: “Regulations 
designed for that salutary purpose nevertheless may further the purpose so 
marginally, and interfere with commerce so substantially, as to be invalid 
under the Commerce Clause.”  Id. at 670.  
52. The Court also uses the rational basis test in cases involving Congress’ 
enumerated power to regulate interstate commerce.  See generally Gonzales v. 
Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). But see James M. McGoldrick, Jr, The Commerce 
Clause, the Preposition, and the Rational Basis Test, 14 U. MASS. L. REV. 182 
(arguing that the rational basis test is the wrong test for determining federal 
enumerated power). 
53. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla. Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (“The 
day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial 
conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with 
a particular school of thought. We emphasize again what Chief Justice Waite 
said in Munn v. State of Illinois, ‘For protection against abuses by legislatures 
the people must resort to the polls, not to the courts.’”). 
54. S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (emphasis added).  Assistant 
federal defender F. Italia Patti acknowledges this difference, “The Supreme 
Court takes two divergent approaches to Fourteenth Amendment and dormant 
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III. The factors used in the balancing test to determine undue 
burdens on interstate commerce 
 
The Southern Pacific Court stated what the modern undue 
burdens balancing test encompasses.  The “relative weights of 
the state and national interest involved” have to be balanced 
against each other.55  The “nature and extent of the burden” on 
“the free flow of interstate commerce” has to be balanced against 
“the state regulation of interstate trains, adopted as a safety 
measure.”56  Pike v. Bruce Church,57 which is discussed in detail 
later, has the more widely quoted version of the balancing test.  
Pike stated that “evenhanded” and “incidental” burdens on 
interstate commerce “will be upheld unless the burden imposed 
on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative 
local benefits.  If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the 
question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden 
that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the 
local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as 
well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.”58  Pike is 
 
Commerce Clause cases. The Court takes a passive approach in Fourteenth 
Amendment cases, deferring substantially to legislatures, and an active 
approach in dormant Commerce clause cases, deferring little to legislatures.” 
F. Italia Patti, Judicial Deference and Political Power in Fourteenth 
Amendment and Dormant Commerce Clause Cases, 56 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 221, 
223 (2019).  But Patti argues that the Court has the level of review just the 
opposite of what it should be, that ordinary people need more protection than 
the kinds of businesses often involved in Dormant Commerce Clause cases; 
“Therefore, the Court should be more active in Fourteenth Amendment cases 
because the plaintiffs generally have less political power and more passive in 
dormant Commerce Clause cases because the plaintiffs have more political 
power.” Id. at 244–45.  
55. S. Pac. Co., 325 U.S. at 770.  
56. Id. at 770–71 (“Hence the matters for ultimate determination here are 
the nature and extent of the burden which the state regulation of interstate 
trains, adopted as a safety measure, imposes on interstate commerce, and 
whether the relative weights of the state and national interests involved are 
such as to make inapplicable the rule, generally observed, that the free flow of 
interstate commerce and its freedom from local restraints in matters requiring 
uniformity of regulation are interests safeguarded by the commerce clause 
from state interference.”).  Justice Scalia ridicules this approach, stating that 
“It is more like judging whether a particular line is longer than a particular 
rock is heavy.”  Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enter.’s, Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 
897 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
57. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
58. Id.  
16https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss1/2
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important to the balancing test in that the Court introduces the 
relevance of considering whether some alternative law might 
hurt interstate commerce less.59 
Southern Pacific involved the constitutionality of the 
Arizona Train Limit Law of 1912, which made it unlawful to 
operate a train within the state of Arizona “of more than 
fourteen passenger or seventy freight cars.”60  Southern Pacific 
anticipated almost all of the factors involved in the modern 
balancing test.61  Among the important factors considered by 
Southern Pacific are the following:  (1) What is the “nature and 
extent of the burden” on interstate commerce?  The “extent” of 
the burden is a practical factual evaluation.  In Southern Pacific, 
the interstate impact on interstate commerce was obvious and 
far-reaching.  (2) What is the nature and extent of the state and 
local interests burdening interstate commerce?  The extent of 
the local interests also involves a practical factual evaluation.  
In Southern Pacific, the state’s safety interests were at best 
problematic.  The protection of railroad employees was largely 
offset by the incremental danger to employees and the public 
from the increased number of trains crossing public roads within 
the state.  (3) Are state and local laws politically self-correcting?  
This is determined by the degree to which the burden of any 
particular local law falls on interstate commerce.  The logic is 
that if the burden falls mostly in state, then the political 
processes within the state would lead to a lessening of the 
restrictions of the law and if the burden was primarily out of 
state, then there was the greater need for the courts to step in.  
(4) Is there a significant danger of multiplicity of inconsistent 
local regulations? If the thing being regulated is subject to 
different regulations by several different states, then interstate 
companies might find it impossible or difficult to comply with 
various inconsistent regulations.  This was a significant issue in 
Southern Pacific.  (5) Is there a need for uniformity versus a need 
for diversity?  Although Cooley is no longer the primary test, the 
 
59. Pike seems to place the burden on the person claiming an undue 
burden in that it says the burdens have to be “clearly excessive in relation to 
the putative local benefits. Id.  
60. S. Pac. Co., 325 U.S. at 763. 
61. I use a version of this list in an earlier article. See generally James M. 
McGoldrick, Jr, Why Does Justice Thomas Hate the Commerce Clause?, Loy. 
New Orleans (forthcoming). 
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need for uniformity versus diversity is still very much a part of 
the modern balancing test.  Because of the inherently interstate 
nature of railroads, there was a great need for uniformity in 
Southern Pacific.  (6) Is the impact on interstate commerce direct 
or indirect?  While the direct/indirect burdens test is at best an 
ambiguous concept, the concept may have some usefulness as 
part of the balancing test.  This issue is raised only marginally 
in Southern Pacific.  (7) Is there any federal legislation 
indicating Congress’ desire?  This is a more important issue in 
later cases than it was in Southern Pacific, but it was one factor 
in Southern Pacific.  (8) Are there reasonable alternatives to 
advancing the legitimate state interest without undue harm to 
interstate commerce?  This is the only element of a modern test 
not considered in Southern Pacific. It is Pike’s main contribution 
to the balancing test of Southern Pacific.  More specifically, this 
is how Southern Pacific and related cases applied these factors.62 
 
A. What is the “nature and extent of the burden” on interstate 
commerce? 
 
Of primary importance in the undue burdens balancing 
approach is the practical evaluation of the importance of the 
state interest versus the actual impact on interstate commerce.63  
In Southern Pacific, the extent of the harm to interstate 
commerce was obvious. Compared to comparable routes in other 
states, up to eighty-five percent of all interstate freight trains, 
and forty-three percent of passenger trains, would have been 
longer than the Arizona limits.64  The Arizona law meant that 
longer interstate trains had to be broken up into shorter trains, 
costing the two railroads crossing in Arizona about $1,000,000 
per year,65 and impacting railroad traffic from El Paso, Texas to 
Los Angeles, California.66  The Court said that there was “no 
doubt” that the Arizona law “imposes a serious burden on the 
 
62. This list is intended to be exhaustive, but I would settle for 
comprehensive. 
63. Although the Court could have conducted its own factual findings as 
to a matter of constitutional law, the Court relied on the findings of facts of the 
state trial court. S. Pac. Co., 325 U.S. at 771. 
64. Id.  
65. Id. at 772. 
66. Id. at 774–75. 
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interstate commerce,” “materially impedes the movement of 
appellant’s interstate trains” and “interposes a substantial 
obstruction to the national policy proclaimed by Congress, to 
promote adequate, economical and efficient railway 
transportation service.”67 
It is not clear what the Court meant by “nature” when it 
referred to “nature and extent” as to the burden on interstate 
commerce.68  In most of the cases, the focus is on the actual harm 
to interstate commerce without any distinction between what 
might be the “nature” versus what might be the “extent.”  But in 
some cases, the nature of the harm was deemed more important 
than the extent.  In referring to a clear type of discrimination 
where the state requires that a particular business be done 
within the state, the Court in Pike said, “The nature of that 
burden is, constitutionally, more significant than its extent. For 
the Court has viewed with particular suspicion state statutes 
requiring business operations to be performed in the home State 
that could more efficiently be performed elsewhere.”  In 
Wyoming v. Oklahoma, Oklahoma discriminated against 
interstate commerce by imposing a requirement that ten percent 
of the coal used in coal fired electrical plants come from 
Oklahoma.69  Oklahoma defended the requirement because it 
was only ten percent.  The Court stated that the extent of the 
harm was not controlling; “The volume of commerce affected 
measures only the extent of the discrimination; it is of no 
relevance to the determination whether a State has 
discriminated against interstate commerce.”70  In cases not 
involving discrimination, it is not clear that the nature of the 
 
67. Id. at 773. 
68. The Court in its conclusion in Southern Pacific referenced the “nature” 
of the burden on interstate commerce, “The contrast between the present 
regulation and the full train crew laws in point of their effects on the commerce, 
and the like contrast with the highway safety regulations, in point of the nature 
of the subject of regulation and the state’s interest in it, illustrate and 
emphasize the considerations which enter into a determination of the relative 
weights of state and national interests where state regulation affecting 
interstate commerce is attempted.”  Id. at 783 (emphasis added). 
69. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 440 (1992). 
70. Id. at 455. (emphasis in the original).  It is somewhat hard to accept 
the claim that the extent of the burden was an irrelevancy. Even diverting only 
ten percent of Wyoming coal to Oklahoma would have been a staggering 
amount of money. Wyoming lost over half a million dollars per year in 
severance taxes alone. Id. at 445.  
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burden has any special significance.  Certainly, in the cases 
involving evenhanded legislation, the practical extent of the 
burden seems more important than the nature of the harm. 
 
B. What is the nature and extent of the state interests burdening 
interstate commerce? 
 
As to extent, Southern Pacific is a good illustration of the 
Court looking closely at the practical importance of the actual 
state interest.  The state’s interest in shorter trains was a 
concern for something called “slack action.”  Slack action is an 
example of one of Sir Isaac Newton’s laws—that for every action 
there is an opposite and equal reaction.  A common illustration 
of Newton’s law is found in the desktop toy called Newton’s 
Cradle,71  where five balls are hung from a cradle and can be 
made to swing in different combinations.  Under the same 
principle, the longer the train, the more energy—slack action—
was transferred to the end cars resulting in potential injuries to 
train employees.  This may have been a real danger when the 
Arizona law was passed in 1912.  At one point, railroad 
employees had to run across the top of railroad cars to set breaks 
and release couplings, but with the passage of The Railroad 
Safety Appliance Act of 1893, improved brakes and couplers 
made it less necessary for railroad employees to run across the 
tops of railroad cars.72  Nonetheless, statistics from 1939 
indicated that 399 train employees had been injured by slack 
action, including three fatalities.73 
It was not necessary for the Court to directly confront 
whether the number of injuries and fatalities to railroad 
employees justified the harm to interstate commerce.  In a 
somewhat unusual twist, the Court found that whatever the 
validity of the concern for slack action, the slack action concerns 
were more than offset by the increased injuries as a result of the 
need for railroads to operate almost one third more trains in 
Arizona.  It is a fact of life that trains crossing intersections with 
cars and pedestrians kill people, and in 1939, 1,398 persons were 
 
71. For an example of Newton’s Cradle in use, see generally The Office: 
Michael Scott Paper Company (NBC television broadcast Apr. 9, 2009).  
72. Railroad Safety Appliance Act, 27 Stat. 531 (1893) (current version at 
49 U.S.C. § 20302 (1994)).   
73. S. Pac. Co., 325 U.S. at 777 n.6. 
20https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss1/2
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killed and 3,999 injured in Arizona.74  The Arizona law meant 
thirty percent more crossings, leading to the real possibility that 
a third of those being killed or injured were as a result of the 
train limits.75  The additional trains also contributed to more 
injuries to railroad employees, because of the greater number of 
stops and starts, perhaps even leading to more slack action 
injuries.76 
The nature of the state interest is harder to discern.77  The 
nature of the state interest, while not entirely clear, seems to 
suggest that certain interests are accorded more weight than 
others.  The Court has said that local safety matters, 
particularly related to roads, have to be given considerable 
weight heavily in favor of the state in justifying a burden on 
interstate commerce; “Few subjects of state regulation are so 
peculiarly of local concern as is the use of state highways.”78  
Southern Pacific seemed to address the nature of the state 
interest in rejecting Barnwell Brothers as a controlling 
precedent.  The Court said that “the weight and width of motor 
cars passing interstate over its highways, a legislative field over 
which the state has a far more extensive control than over 
interstate railroads.”79  The presumption that safety regulation 
 
74. In about 1958, I avoided being a statistic when I tried to beat a train 
on my bicycle on my way home from the Manteca, California public library. I 
made it; the library books bungee-corded in a cardboard box to the back of my 
bicycle did not. 
75. S. Pac. Co., 325 U.S. at 772. 
76. Id. at 777–78. 
77. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970). Pike’s statement of its 
balancing test balances the “nature of the local interest” versus “extent of the 
burden” but does not attempt to develop what it means by “nature of the local 
interest” as opposed to the practical importance of the state interest. Id.  In 
Pike itself the state had claimed an interest in protecting Arizona’s reputation 
for quality cantaloupe, hardly an earth shattering interest, but not something 
in its nature clearly inappropriate. Id. Unlike burdens on interstate commerce, 
the courts do not typically refer to the “nature and extent” of the local interest. 
There are occasional exceptions. Underhill Assocs. Inc. v. Bradshaw, 674 F.2d 
293, 295 (4th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted) (“To determine Virginia’s power to 
regulate the activities of nonresidents, we must look to the extent of these 
nonresidents’ contacts with Virginia and to the nature and extent of the state’s 
interest in exercising its authority.”). Underhill, 674 F.2d at 295, cited to 
Travelers Health Ass’n v. Virgina ex rel. State Corp. Com’n, 339 U.S. 643 
(1950), which did not actually use the compound phrase “nature and extent” 
but did discuss “nature” and “extent” separately a number of times. 
78. S.C. State Highway Dep’t v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 187 (1938). 
79. S. Pac. Co., 325 U.S. at 783. 
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of public highways was by the nature of the interest inherently 
weighty is one of the lasting by-products of the Barnwell 
Brother’s case, and is referenced in a number of cases.80 
Two early Twentieth Century cases involving certificate of 
conveniences for interstate trucks recognizes that the Court is 
more willing to accept the nature of the state interest in public 
safety than as to economic competition.81 In one case, Ohio 
expressed concern for traffic congestion in denying a certificate 
of convenience to an out of state trucking company, which 
seemed to be important in the Court finding no Dormant 
Commerce Clause violation.82  In the other case, the Court found 
a violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause from the state of 
Washington’s denial of a certificate of convenience to an out of 
state company, because of the state’s concern for destructive 
competition.83  Although a concern for competition is not a per se 
violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause,84  the Court would 
 
80. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 523 (1959) (“The 
power of the State to regulate the use of its highways is broad and pervasive. 
We have recognized the peculiarly local nature of this subject of safety, and 
have upheld state statutes applicable alike to interstate and intrastate 
commerce, despite the fact that they may have an impact on interstate 
commerce.”).  
81. A District Court took this as the lesson from Pike, “[W]hen it comes to 
the dormant Commerce Clause, health and safety regulations are more tenable 
than standard economic regulation. When these concerns are at issue, 
somewhat greater burdens may be placed on interstate commerce than might 
otherwise be acceptable.” All. of Auto. Mfrs. v. Kirkpatrick, No. CIV. 02-149-B-
W, 2003 WL 21684464, at *12 (D. Me. July 17, 2003), report and 
recommendation adopted, No. CIV. 02-149-B-W, 2004 WL 305598 (D. Me. Feb. 
17, 2004)   
82. Bradley v. Pub. Utilities Comm’n of Ohio, 289 U.S. 92, 95 (1933) (“In 
the case at bar, the purpose of the denial was to promote safety; and the test 
employed was congestion of the highway.”).  
83. Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307, 315 (1925) (“Its primary purpose is 
not regulation with a view to safety or to conservation of the highways, but the 
prohibition of competition.”); The Fourth Circuit remanded a case to the 
District Court where “competition” was one factor in granting a “certificate of 
public need” to operate a medical enterprise in the state of Virginia. Colon 
Health Centers of Am., LLC v. Hazel, 733 F.3d 535, 540 (4th Cir. 2013). 
84. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).  In Parker, in order to lessen 
the destructive price competition between California raisin growers, California 
created a brokerage system whereby California raisin growers had to turn over 
most of their crops to a state agency that would bargain with buyers of raisins. 
Id. The end result was to get a higher price for the raisin growers with the bulk 
of the burden of that higher price falling on interstate purchasers of raisins. 
Id. Despite the harm to interstate commerce from the state’s attempt to give 
California raisin growers a competitive advantage, the Court upheld the law. 
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seem to be more accepting of a safety rationale than a 
competition rationale for burdens on interstate commerce.85 
In Southern Pacific, all things considered, the actual 
importance of the state interest—slack action injuries and 
deaths versus crossing intersection injuries and deaths—was, 
the Court concluded, “at most slight and dubious.”86  Based upon 
these first two factors alone, nature and extent of the burden on 
interstate commerce versus the nature and extent of the local 
interest, the Arizona Train Limit Law would have likely failed 
the balancing test.  As the Southern Pacific Court said, it had a 
“seriously adverse effect on transportation efficiency and 
economy” and did not appear to “lessen rather than increase the 
danger of accident.”87  Nonetheless, Southern Pacific considered 
other factors that might very well be important in deciding 
factually closer cases. 
 
C. Are state and local laws politically self-correcting?88 
 
In Southern Pacific, the Court stated that “to the extent that 
the burden of state regulation falls on interests outside the state, 
it is unlikely to be alleviated by the operation of those political 
restraints normally exerted when interests within the state are 
affected.”89  Factually, it would be harder to find a case with 
 
Id.  
85. Auclair Transp., Inc. v. State, 305 A.2d 662, 664 (N.H. 1973). The New 
Hampshire Supreme Court nicely summarized this difference, “But in the 
absence of such federal authorization, a State public utilities commission has 
no constitutional power to permit or prohibit interstate carriage by motor 
freight carrier on grounds primarily related to competition and not highway 
safety and conservation.” Id.   
86. The Arizona trial court “found that the Arizona law had no reasonable 
relation to safety.” S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 779 (1945). 
87.  Id. at 781–82. 
88. Catherine Gage O’Grady, Targeting State Protectionism Instead of 
Interstate Discrimination Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, 34 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 571, 582–83 (1997) (the doctrine is sometimes called the “inner political 
check doctrine.”).  
89. S. Pac. Co., 325 U.S. at 767 n.2. The concept of state law impacting 
interstate commerce being politically self-correcting dates as far back as 1865, 
“If a State exercise unwisely the power here in question [building a bridge 
affecting interstate commerce], the evil consequences will fall chiefly upon her 
own citizens. They have more at stake than the citizens of any other State. 
Hence, there is as little danger of the abuse of this power as of any other 
reserved to the States.” See Gilman v. City of Philadelphia, 70 U.S. 713, 731 
23
2019 THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE 67 
more of a disproportionate impact on interstate commerce; 
“approximately 93% of the freight traffic and 95% of the 
passenger traffic in Arizona was interstate.”90  To the degree 
that the Court’s theory that the political processes will work less 
well if the burdens are out of state, then Arizona would have 
little incentive to correct the abuses of the Train Limit Law.  The 
law was unlikely to be politically self-correcting.91 
In Southern Pacific, the Court reasoned that because the 
burden fell primarily on interstate commerce, there was little in-
state political incentive to revise the 1912 law to lessen the 
impact.92  The concern for whether a particular law might be 
politically self-correcting was raised by Justice Stone, the author 
of Southern Pacific, in another footnote in the 1938 Barnwell 
case, “[W]hen the regulation is of such a character that its 
burden falls principally upon those without the state, legislative 
action is not likely to be subjected to those political restraints 
which are normally exerted on legislation where it affects 
adversely some interests within the state.”93 
 
D. Is there a significant danger of multiplicity of inconsistent 
local regulations? 
 
In Southern Pacific, many other states had either 
considered or passed maximum train lengths, and the Court 
recognized the issues that may arise due to inconsistent 
regulations across state lines: “[T]he confusion and difficulty 
 
(1865).  
90. S. Pac. Co. 325 U.S., at 771. 
91. Perhaps the Court’s view of what would be politically self-correcting 
is somewhat narrow.  It would seem that the affected railroad companies might 
have used their spending power to influence legislation in Arizona even if the 
impact was out of state. But the reality in the case seems to have been 
otherwise. It may be that the Train Limit Law had advantages to the economy 
of Arizona not mentioned in the case, such as the employment within the state 
of the railroad employees used to transfer the nearly one-third additional 
trains across the state. In another case considering the political processes, 
Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 447 (1978) the Court found 
that the number of exceptions to a law limiting the length of trucks “weaken 
the presumption in favor of the validity of the general limit, because they 
undermine the assumption that the State’s own political processes will act as 
a check on local regulations that unduly burden interstate commerce.” 
92. S. Pac. Co., 325 U.S. at 771–72.   
93. S.C. State Highway Dep’t v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 186 (1938). 
Barnwell made no effort to apply the concept. 
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with which interstate operations would be burdened under the 
varied system of state regulation and the unsatisfied need for 
uniformity in such regulation, if any, are evident.”94  The facts of 
Southern Pacific could hardly have been clearer in establishing 
the danger of inconsistent train limit regulations.  Although only 
three such laws had actually been passed since 1920, over 164 
such laws had been introduced to state legislatures.95  While it 
would not be strictly true that an interstate railroad would be 
physically unable to comply with the different laws, it would 
have been exceedingly difficult.96  Among the examples the 
Court gave had the various proposed laws passed, “A train from 
Arkansas to Wisconsin might be subjected to a fifty car 
maximum (Arkansas), one-half mile (Mississippi), three 
thousand feet (Iowa), one and a half miles (Minnesota), and 
thirty-three hundred feet (Wisconsin).”97  Or another example: 
 
A train running from Nebraska to California 
might be subject to a sixty, seventy-five or eighty-
five maximum in Nebraska, to a limit fixed by 
commission in Kansas, to a sixty-five car limit in 
Colorado, to a seventy-five car limit in New 
Mexico, to a seventy car limit in Arizona, and to a 
seventy-four car limit in California.98 
 
Had the balance between the harm to interstate commerce 
and importance of the state safety interest been closer in 
Southern Pacific, the multiplicity of inconsistent state 
regulations might very well have made a difference. 
One case where the danger of the multiplicity of 
inconsistent burdens seemed to be the deciding factor was Bibb 
 
94. S. Pac. Co., 325 U.S. at 774. See also Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 
Inc. 359 U.S. 520 (1959).  
95. S. Pac. Co., 325 U.S. at 773, n.3.  
96. One of the other concerns is that in the face of inconsistent state laws, 
a dominant state’s laws will become the national standard by default. Brannon 
P. Denning, Extraterritoriality and the Dormant Commerce Clause: A 
Doctrinal Post-Mortem, 73 LA. L. REV. 979, 1006 (2013) (“A related fear was 
that one state might establish a rule that was more strict than any other state’s 
rule and that an interstate actor might comply with the strict rule, thus 
permitting a single state to establish a de facto national standard.”).   
97. S. Pac. Co., 325 U.S. at 774, n.4. 
98. Id.  
25
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v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc.99  In Bibb, the state of Illinois 
required trucks operating in Illinois, including interstate trucks 
with certificates from the Interstate Commerce Commission, to 
have curved mudflaps.  Almost all of the other continental states 
allowed the conventional straight mudflaps, and Arkansas 
disallowed curved mudflaps.100  Interstate trucks often saved 
time in loading and unloading trailers from other trucking 
companies by switching trailers in lieu of actually loading and 
unloading, a practice called interlining.  As a result of 
interlining, the trailer might be allowed in a state in which the 
truck cabin was not.  The conflict between the Illinois law and 
the Arkansas law meant that the same trailer could not be used 
in both Illinois and Arkansas, which because of interlining might 
be quite common.101  The Court in an opinion by Justice Douglas 
said that if the only issue was the cost of compliance, up to 
$45,840,102 or of the much-disputed safety advantages,103 he 
would rule in favor of Illinois.  But because the conflict between 
Illinois and Arkansas disrupted interlining, one of the bedrocks 
of the trucking industry, he found the burden on interstate 
commerce to be too great.  In Southern Pacific, Justice Douglas 
had argued that only discriminatory laws violate the Dormant 
Commerce Clause,104 but Bibb he said was “one of those cases—
 
99. See Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959). 
100. Id. at 523. 
101. One can see the practice of interlining in the railroad industry 
anytime one is stopped at a railroad crossing. During even the briefest of stops, 
one will observe railroad cars from a multitude of different railroad lines. I 
personally consider it a lucky day when I see a car from the Wabash 
Cannonball, more formally called the Rock Island Line, because my dad loved 
country western legend Roy Acuff’s 1938 version of a song about the line: “Hear 
the mighty rush of the engine hear those lonesome hoboes call Traveling through 
the jungle on the Wabash Cannonball.” ROY ACUFF, Wabash Cannonball, on 
THE ESSENTIAL ROY ACUFF (Sony BMG Music Ent. 2004). 
102. Bibb, 359 U.S. at 525. 
103. Id. Illinois claimed that curved mudflaps help prevent gravel and 
other debris from being tossed into the windshield of trailing cars. Among other 
things on the other side of the argument, the curved flaps were said to make 
the truck breaks less effective because of heat accumulation. 
104. S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 795 ( Douglas, J., dissenting) 
(citations omitted):  
 
I have expressed my doubts whether the courts should 
intervene in situations like the present and strike down state 
legislation on the grounds that it burdens interstate 
commerce. My view has been that the courts should intervene 
26https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss1/2
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few in number—where local safety measures that are 
nondiscriminatory place an unconstitutional burden on 
interstate commerce.”105  
 
E. Is there a need for uniformity versus a need for diversity? 
 
Although the test in Cooley is no longer the primary test, 
the need for uniformity versus diversity is still very much a part 
of the balancing test in Southern Pacific. Southern Pacific dated 
the concern for uniformity from the earliest recognition of 
Dormant Commerce Clause concerns: 
 
But ever since Gibbons v. Ogden, the states have 
not been deemed to have authority to impede 
substantially the free flow of commerce from state 
to state, or to regulate those phases of the national 
commerce which, because of the need of national 
uniformity, demand that their regulation, if any, 
 
only where the state legislation discriminated against 
interstate commerce or was out of harmony with laws which 
Congress had enacted. 
 
Professor Eule agrees with this view of Justice Douglas, “It no longer makes 
sense for the Court to invalidate evenhanded state legislation merely because 
it burdens interstate commerce too heavily.” Julian N. Eule, Laying the 
Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 436 (1982). 
105.  Bibb, 359 U.S. at 529. In Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982), 
Justice White’s plurality opinion struck down on direct/indirect Dormant 
Commerce Clause grounds an Illinois law that regulated hostile takeovers in 
any attempt that involved a target company where ten percent of the target 
company’s shares were owned by shareholders located in Illinois, whereas “The 
Commerce Clause, permits only incidental regulation of interstate commerce 
by the States; direct regulation is prohibited.” Id. at 640. Justice White 
concluded that the Illinois law was a direct regulation because of its “sweeping 
extraterritorial effect.” Id. at 642. Under the ten percent standard, at least ten 
different states could regulate the same hostile takeover. Other members of 
the Court agreed that the law violated the Dormant Commerce Clause, but 
based upon the balancing test, “for even when a state statute regulates 
interstate commerce indirectly, the burden imposed on that commerce must 
not be excessive in relation to the local interests served by the statute.” Id. at 
643. In CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987), the Court 
upheld an Indiana regulation of hostile takeovers that applied only to 
companies incorporated in Indiana. Although the plurality in Mite emphasized 
the direct versus indirect burden, Mite presented a real danger of inconsistent 
state regulations while CTS presented none, because it only applied to 
corporations incorporated in the home state. 
27
2019 THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE 71 
be prescribed by a single authority.106 
 
Southern Pacific recognized the state’s ability to regulate 
some matters affecting interstate commerce “provided it does 
not materially restrict the free flow of commerce across state 
lines, or interfere with it in matters with respect to 
which uniformity of regulation is of predominant national 
concern.”107  In the Court’s statement of its balancing test, it 
emphasized that one of the purposes of the balancing was to 
ensure “that the free flow of interstate commerce and its 
freedom from local restraints in matters requiring uniformity of 
regulation are interests safeguarded by the commerce clause 
from state interference.”108  As to the facts of Southern Pacific, 
the Court emphasized the need for uniformity at least three 
times.  First, it noted that most interstate trains were longer 
than the Arizona limits and that “if the length of trains is to be 
regulated at all, national uniformity in the regulation adopted, 
such as only Congress can prescribe, is practically indispensable 
to the operation of an efficient and economical national railway 
system.”109  Second, it concluded, “Enforcement of the law in 
Arizona, while train lengths remain unregulated or are 
regulated by varying standards in other states, must inevitably 
result in an impairment of uniformity of efficient railroad 
operation because the railroads are subjected to regulation 
which is not uniform in its application.”110  Third, as to train 
limit laws generally, it said, “With such laws in force in states 
which are interspersed with those having no limit on train 
lengths, the confusion and difficulty with which interstate 
operations would be burdened under the varied system of state 
regulation and the unsatisfied need for uniformity in such 
 
106. S. Pac. Co., 325 U.S. at 767 (citations omitted). The Court also cited 
to Cooley for this proposition. See Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens 53 U.S. 299 (1851). 
107. S. Pac. Co., 325 U.S at 770. 
108. Id. at 770–71. 
109. Id. at 771. 
110. Id. at 773. Justice Thomas in a 2007 case said that the Court’s 
reliance on Cooley “is curious because the Court has abandoned the reasoning 
of those cases in its more recent jurisprudence.” United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. 
Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 350 (2007). He later 
double downs and says the Cooley test has “been rejected entirely.” Id. at 351. 
Southern Pacific seems more of an evolution than abandonment, and it hardly 
seems a rejection in its entirety.   
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regulation, if any, are evident.”111 
 
F. Is the impact on interstate commerce direct or indirect? 
 
The concerns for direct versus indirect impact on interstate 
commerce can be traced to one of the earliest Dormant 
Commerce Clause cases.  In Black Bird Creek, a state law 
permitted the building of a dam to address the local matter of 
troublesome swamplands, which impacted interstate commerce 
by obstructing navigation as to a minor interstate tributary. 
Chief Justice Marshall dismissed any Dormant Commerce 
Clause concerns leading to the later proposition that local laws 
that incidentally or indirectly impacted interstate commerce 
might be presumptively less harmful to interstate commerce 
than a local law that intended to directly regulate commerce in 
another state.112 Southern Pacific did not use the term “direct” 
or “indirect,” but it seemed to refer to this concern: 
 
When the regulation of matters of local concern is 
local in character and effect, and its impact on the 
national commerce does not seriously interfere 
with its operation, and the consequent incentive 
to deal with them nationally is slight, such 
regulation has been generally held to be within 
state authority.113 
 
While this language seems to refer to the same concerns as 
in Black Bird Creek, Southern Pacific may have been mildly 
praised or criticized—it is hard to know which—in Pike v. Bruce 
Church for using a balancing test as opposed to the 
direct/indirect approach: “Occasionally the Court has candidly 
undertaken a balancing approach in resolving these 
issues, Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, but more frequently it 
 
111. S. Pac. Co., 325 U.S at 774, n.4. Note four of the Court’s opinion 
summarized at this point the impact on interstate commerce if various 
proposed laws regulating train lengths had actually been passed.   
112. Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 36 (1980) (“Over the 
years, the Court has used a variety of formulations for the Commerce Clause 
limitation upon the States, but it consistently has distinguished between 
outright protectionism and more indirect burdens on the free flow of trade.”).  
113. S. Pac. Co., 325 U.S. at 767. 
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has spoken in terms of ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ effects and 
burdens.”114 
The Pike Court was surely correct that prior to Southern 
Pacific the Court was more likely to refer to direct or indirect 
burdens as opposed to undue burdens balancing. To the degree 
that direct or indirect has any meaning,115 the Southern Pacific 
Court seems to refer to “indirect” burdens when it uses the 
phrases “matters of local concern” and “local in character and 
effect.”  In short, burdens on interstate commerce are indirect 
when the state attempts to address a local problem but in so 
doing incidentally or indirectly impacts interstate commerce.  In 
Black Bird Creek, the state was trying to address a concern for 
the economic and health aspects of a local marsh,116 and in 
allowing a dam to be built that addressed that local concern, it 
incidentally or indirectly obstructed an interstate stream. 
“Incidental,” is the watchword for virtually every modern 
Supreme Court statement about the Dormant Commerce 
Clause. Generally, as in Pike v. Bruce Church, statements of the 
balancing rule require that the law be both “evenhanded” and 
“incidental.”117  This is almost always the preface to what is 
commonly called the Pike balancing test.118  It has become 
almost the mantra for lower courts.119  The meaning of 
 
114. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (citations 
omitted). 
115. Professor Denning refers to the “ultimate sterility of the 
direct/indirect test.” Brannon P. Denning, Reconstructing the Dormant 
Commerce Clause Doctrine, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 417, 441 (2008). 
116. See Chief Justice Marshall’s speculation, “The value of the property 
on its banks must be enhanced by excluding the water from the marsh, and the 
health of the inhabitants probably improved.” Willson v. Black Bird Creek 
Marsh Co., 27 U.S. 245, 251 (1829). 
117. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.  Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979) 
(“Under that general rule, we must inquire whether the challenged statute 
regulates evenhandedly with only ‘incidental’ effects on 
interstate commerce...”).  
118. Alliant Energy Corp. v. Bie, 330 F.3d 904, 911 (7th Cir. 2003) (“This 
test has become known as the Pike balancing test.”). According to Westlaw, 
over 1,000 cases cite to Pike, using both the terms “evenhanded” and 
“incidental.” Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (see citing references). 
119. See, e.g., Wine & Spirits Retailers, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 481 F.3d 1, 
11 (1st Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“A statute that 
regulates evenhandedly and has only incidental effects on 
interstate commerce engenders a lower level of scrutiny.”); Alliance of Auto. 
Mfrs. v. Gwadosky, 430 F.3d 30, 35 (1st Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (“A state statute that regulates evenhandedly and has 
30https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss1/2
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“evenhanded” is clear enough as a synonym for 
“nondiscriminatory.”120  The meaning of “incidental” seems to be 
a synonym for “indirect.” The Court has restated the Pike 
balancing test and cited to Pike using the term “indirect” in place 
of “incidental.”121 
The bigger question is why it matters whether a state law 
that burdens interstate commerce in an evenhanded kind of way 
is “indirect” or “incidental.”  If the state of Missouri dams up the 
Mississippi river, it is of no consequence that such was the direct 
intent of the State or that the State built a dam to address local 
flooding with the incidental impact of shutting down the 
Mississippi river.  It is the extent of the impact, not whether it 
is incidental or not, that should be important.  It is arguable that 
the damming of Black Bird Creek did not violate the Dormant 
Commerce Clause because it was incidental, but because it only 
impacted a minor interstate tributary.122 
Maybe the Court uses the term “incidental” to signal their 
concern for direct regulations.123  Direct burdens are presumed 
 
only incidental effects on interstate commerce” engenders a lower level of 
scrutiny.”); Pac. Nw. Venison Producers v. Smitch, 20 F.3d 1008, 1013 (9th Cir. 
1994) (“[W]e apply the test for evenhanded regulations 
with incidental burdens on interstate and foreign commerce.”). 
120. Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of State of Or., 511 U.S. 
93, 99 (1994) (citations omitted) (“By contrast, nondiscriminatory regulations 
that have only incidental effects on interstate commerce are valid unless ‘the 
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the 
putative local benefits.’”). The Court used the term “legitimate” as a synonym 
for “evenhanded,” in Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978), 
“The crucial inquiry, therefore, must be directed to determining whether [the 
state law] is basically a protectionist measure, or whether it can fairly be 
viewed as a law directed to legitimate local concerns, with effects upon 
interstate commerce that are only incidental.”  
121. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 
573, 579 (1986) (“When, however, a statute has only indirect effects on 
interstate commerce and regulates evenhandedly, we have examined whether 
the State’s interest is legitimate and whether the burden on interstate 
commerce clearly exceeds the local benefits.”).  
122. See Justice McLean’s comment about Black Bird Creek: “The chief 
justice was speaking of a creek which falls into the Delaware, and admitted in 
the pleadings to be navigable, but of so limited an extent that it might well be 
doubted whether the general regulation of commerce could apply to it. 
Hundreds of creeks within the flow of the tide were similarly situated.” Smith 
v. Turner, 48 U.S. 283, 398 (1849). 
123. For “direct,” the Court in Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 336 
(1989) used the term “extraterritorial effects of state economic regulation.” 
Healy also has one of the Court’s most careful discussions of the modern 
31
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to burden interstate commerce more than indirect burdens.124  
 
meaning of “direct.” Id. at 336. Healy said, “The critical inquiry is whether the 
practical effect of the regulation is to control conduct beyond the boundaries of 
the State.” Id. at 336–37. See also Susan Lorde Martin, The Extraterritoriality 
Doctrine of the Dormant Commerce Clause Is Not Dead, 100 MARQ. L. REV. 497 
(2016).  
124. Some cases equate “direct” with “discrimination” and “indirect” with 
“evenhanded.” Brown-Forman., 476 U.S. at 579 (citations omitted) (emphasis 
added):  
 
When a state statute directly regulates or discriminates 
against interstate commerce, or when its effect is to favor in-
state economic interests over out-of-state interests, we have 
generally struck down the statute without further inquiry. 
When, however, a statute has only indirect effects on 
interstate commerce and regulates evenhandedly, we have 
examined whether the State’s interest is legitimate and 
whether the burden on interstate commerce clearly exceeds 
the local benefits. 
 
Accord Nw. Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm’n of Kan., 489 U.S. 493, 
523 (1989). While some of the cases support equating direct with 
discrimination, this seems a mistake of the highest order. Professor Rosen 
makes this same point: 
 
The Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence that speaks of 
a near per se prohibition of extraterritoriality likewise should 
be understood as applying only to protectionist state statutes; 
some lower-level balancing of the local interests against the 
costs imposed on interstate commerce is appropriate in 
respect of statutes emanating from the state’s historical 
police powers that regulate extraterritorially.  
 
Mark D. Rosen, Extraterritoriality and Political Heterogeneity in American 
Federalism, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 855, 923 (2002). See Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, 
Inc, 294 U.S. 511 (1935), where New York’s attempt to regulate the price at 
which milk was sold in other states was an attempt at equality, not 
discrimination. In order to help New York farmers, New York fixed a minimum 
price that milk dealers had to pay to dairy farmers in state and out of state. It 
was a direct or intentional regulation of the price of milk sold by out of state 
farmers, but it was not discriminatory. Also, in Brown-Forman, New York 
wanted equal treatment of New York alcohol dealers, not any discriminatory 
advantage. Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. 573. Even if the law is not viewed as 
discriminatory, the fact that it intentionally tries to regulate commerce in 
other states may be enough to strike the law down. BlueHippo Funding, LLC 
v. McGraw, 609 F. Supp. 2d 576, 586 (S.D.W. Va. 2009) (“In this circuit, the 
rule of virtual per se invalidity used within the discrimination tier extends 
beyond discriminatory laws and reaches as well those state laws that operate 
extraterritorially.”). Professor Martin seems to endorse this approach, 
“The extraterritorial doctrine applies when a state regulates conduct that is 
wholly outside its own borders and, under the doctrine, unconstitutionality 
32https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss1/2
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Direct burdens are viewed as a deliberate attempt by a state to 
regulate commerce in another state.125  In Baldwin v. Seelig, the 
state of New York, as part of a program to give farmers a higher 
income, fixed the minimum price at which milk had to be 
purchased.  The law, if intentionally applied to farmers in other 
states, would be viewed as a direct burden.  It was not a 
discriminatory tariff as the Court claimed,126 but it might very 
well have dried up the interstate market.127  A milk dealer in 
New York would have no incentive to pursue bargains in another 
state if she had to pay the same amount for her milk whether in 
state or out of state.  Brown-Forman v. New York State Liquor 
Authority128 is perhaps the best modern case illustrating a direct 
 
does not depend on the regulation’s discriminating against out-of-staters.” 
Susan Lorde Martin, The Extraterritoriality Doctrine of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause Is Not Dead, 100 MARQ. L. REV. 497, 501 (2016).  
125. Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 582 (“Forcing a merchant to seek 
regulatory approval in one State before undertaking a transaction in another 
directly regulates interstate commerce.”).   
126. Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 521 (“Such a power, if exerted, will set a barrier 
to traffic between one state and another as effective as if customs duties, equal 
to the price differential, had been laid upon the thing transported.”). The 
higher price to the farmers was not similar to a customs duties or tariff in that 
the difference between the market price and the higher price New York 
required went to the out of state farmer, not to the state as would be the case 
with a tariff. It would be like a tariff in that consumers in New York would 
ultimately have to pay for the higher costs. 
127. Professor McGreal nicely summarizes the effect of cases like 
Baldwin, 294 U.S. 511, stating that: 
 
The detrimental effect of New York’s milk laws on the single 
milk dealer in Baldwin or Hood might not have had a 
significant effect on the national economy, but allowing state 
action of that type would put the nation on a slippery slope to 
interstate trade barriers and other anticompetitive 
measures. 
 
Paul E. McGreal, The Flawed Economics of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 39 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1191, 1222 (1998).  
128. Brown-Foreman v. N.Y. State Liquor Authority, 476 U.S. 573 (1986). 
In one of the more famous cases involving a direct burden, Baldwin, 294 U.S. 
at 522, the Court struck down a law as a “direct” burden because of its 
regulation of the price at which milk could be sold in other states. In Seelig, 
New York law required milk dealers in New York to pay a fixed minimum price 
for milk purchased from farmers, including both in state and out of state 
farmers. Id. New York was attempting to provide dairy farmers a reasonable 
rate of return in a time of oversupply of milk. Id. The closeness of New York to 
neighboring states also producing milk made it impractical to apply its law to 
only in-state purchases. Id. The Court then addressed the argument as to 
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burden.  In Brown-Forman, the Court struck down a New York 
law that required liquor distributors throughout the United 
States to sell to New York wholesalers at the lowest price that 
the liquor was sold anywhere in the United States.  New York 
had a fixed retail price at which liquor had to be sold in New 
York, and it did not want distributors gaming the system with 
unfair profits.  The Court accepted the argument of Brown-
Forman, a distiller of liquor, that the law was a direct burden on 
interstate commerce because it “effectively regulates the price at 
which liquor is sold in other States.”129  It meant that distillers 
could not run special deals in other states without offering the 
dealers in New York the same price. 
Historically, the direct/indirect test was a separate test all 
of its own.  Whether after Wayfair, the direct/indirect test is still 
a separate test is at least debatable, but the test’s exclusion from 
a general statement of the law is hardly conclusive.  Even if it is 
not a separate test, the test still seems to have relevancy as one 
of the factors in the balancing test.130  Incidental or indirect 
 
whether the New York law was a direct or indirect burden:  
 
Nice distinctions have been made at times between direct and 
indirect burdens. They are irrelevant when the avowed 
purpose of the obstruction, as well as its necessary tendency, 
is to suppress or mitigate the consequences of competition 
between the states. Such an obstruction is direct by the very 
terms of the hypothesis. 
  
Id. at 522; One of the earliest cases finding a “direct” burden was Hall v. De 
Cuir., 95 U.S. 485, 488 (1877). The Court struck down a Louisiana law barring 
segregation on trains in Louisiana, including interstate trains, stating that  
“But we think it may safely be said that State legislation which seeks to impose 
a direct burden upon inter-state commerce, or to interfere directly with its 
freedom, does encroach upon the exclusive power of Congress.” Id.  The law, as 
the Court saw it, acted “directly upon the business as it comes into the State 
from without or goes out from within.”  Id. at 489. Although its ostensible 
purpose was to regulate only train travel within the state, “it must necessarily 
influence his conduct to some extent in the management of his business 
throughout his entire voyage.”  Id.  
129. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 476 U.S. at 579. 
130. Daniel Francis, The Decline of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 94 
DENV. L. REV. 255, 268 (2017) (Professor Francis agrees, stating that: “It may 
be right, as Goldsmith and Sykes seem to suggest, that the “extraterritoriality” 
cases may be best assimilated to the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, if at 
all, under the rubric of burden review.”); Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. 
Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 110 YALE L.J. 785, 804 
34https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss1/2
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burdens in a balancing test might be presumed to be less 
harmful to commerce than a direct burden.  Direct burdens 
might be presumed to be more harmful to interstate commerce 
than indirect burdens.  But as a factor in the balancing test, 
“direct” would be only one of the considerations, not the decisive 
factor that it might have been when direct/indirect was its own 
separate test, and direct burdens were presumptively invalid. 
 
G. Is there any federal legislation indicating Congress’ desire? 
 
Congressional laws can impact the Dormant Commerce 
Clause in three different ways.  First, Congress can permit the 
states to regulate interstate commerce in a way that would 
otherwise violate the Dormant Commerce Clause.  Second, 
Congress, pursuant to the doctrine of preemption,131 can prevent 
the states from regulating anything affecting interstate 
commerce, even if such regulations would not run afoul of the 
Dormant Commerce Clause.  As the Court put in in Southern 
Pacific: 
 
Congress has undoubted power to redefine the 
distribution of power over interstate commerce. It 
may either permit the states to regulate the 
commerce in a manner which would otherwise not 
be permissible” or Congress can “exclude state 
regulation even of matters of peculiarly local 
concern which nevertheless affect interstate 
commerce.132 
 
Southern Pacific seemed to recognize a third aspect of 
 
(2001) (“[We] submit that the appropriate statement of the extraterritoriality 
concern is that states may not impose burdens on out-of-state actors that 
outweigh the in-state benefits in the sense that we described above.”). 
131. Under the Supremacy Clause, federal law preempts inconsistent 
state law. U.S. CONST. art. VI. In 1942, Congress specifically suspended all 
state train limit laws as an emergency measure during World War II. S. Pac. 
Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945). Southern Pacific also stated the general 
rule for preemption: “Congress, in enacting legislation within its constitutional 
authority over interstate commerce, will not be deemed to have intended to 
strike down a state statute designed to protect the health and safety of the 
public unless its purpose to do so is clearly manifested.”  Id. at 766.   
132. Id. at 769 (citations omitted). 
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federal law.  Even if a federal law does not permit state burdens 
on interstate commerce or preempt state law that would not 
violate the Dormant Commerce Clause, federal law can be a 
factor in the balancing test as further evidence that Congress 
believed that a subject was either one of national importance 
needing uniformity or a local matter needing diversity of 
regulation. 
Under the third factor, the federal law is but one aspect of 
the balancing test, not a determinative factor all by itself.  In 
Southern Pacific, the Court said that the Arizona law 
“interposes a substantial obstruction to the national policy 
proclaimed by Congress [in the Interstate Commerce Act], to 
promote adequate, economical and efficient railway 
transportation service.”133  Federal law, though not specifically 
controlling, was one factor indicating that Congress believed 
that there was a need for uniformity of regulations as to 
railways.  Admittedly, the federal law was not a major part of 
the balancing test in Southern Pacific, but it does appear to be 
one factor.  In Huron Portland Cement v. Detroit the Court 
referred, though not by name, to the federal Air Pollution 
Control Act of 1955 as having “recently recognized the 
importance and legitimacy” of “elimination of air pollution to 
protect the health and enhance the cleanliness of the local 
community.”134  The Court said that the legislation was 
recognition that Congress believed that “air pollution is 
peculiarly a matter of state and local concern is manifest in this 
legislation. “135  The Senate Committee Report had underlined 
that point; “The committee recognizes that it is the primary 
responsibility of State and local governments to 
prevent air pollution.”136  The Court’s primary issue in Huron 
Portland Cement was a preemption issue, but in summary 
fashion, it also dismissed the Dormant Commerce Clause 
issue.137 
 
133. Id. at 773 (citing to Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 3-22 
(Suppl. 2 1925)). 
134. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, Mich., 362 U.S. 440, 
445 (1960). 
135. Id. at 446. 
136. Id. 
137. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 354 (1943), upholding California’s 
brokerage form of selling its raisins in part because Congress had authorized 
similar laws as to other farm commodities. (“It is evident, therefore, that the 
36https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss1/2
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8. Are there reasonable alternatives to advancing the legitimate 
state interest without undue harm to interstate commerce? 
 
Pike introduces consideration of whether there might be 
some state regulation with a “lesser impact” on interstate 
commerce.  This was likely an unstated part of Southern 
Pacific’s balancing test.  The balancing test for the Dormant 
Commerce Clause is what would be called in Constitutional Law 
circles138 an intermediate test, which is variously framed, but 
will often include some version of a “lesser impact” or reasonable 
alternative requirement,139 sometimes if only obliquely with the 
requirement that the law be “narrowly tailored”140 or “be 
 
[federal] Marketing Act contemplates the existence of state programs at least 
until such time as the Secretary [of Agriculture] shall establish a federal 
marketing program, unless the state program in some way conflicts with the 
policy of the federal act.”). Id.  
138. Each region of the country will have its own rituals for these circle 
gatherings, but in California, brie and chardonnay are usually served. 
139. A common intermediate test for content neutral regulations of speech 
is found in United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367(1968). There, the Court 
upheld laws impacting content neutral speech, including symbolic speech, “if 
the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; 
and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no 
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.”  Id. at 377 
(emphasis added). The phrase “no greater than essential” would be similar to 
no “lesser impact.”   
140. The Court’s intermediate test for content neutral time, place, and 
manner regulations required that any law restricting such speech must be 
“narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they 
leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.” 
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (emphasis added) 
(citations omitted) (internal quotes omitted).  Both the “narrowly tailored” and 
“alternative channels” suggest something similar to “lesser impact.”  Id.  
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substantially related”141 to the purpose.142  As to state laws that 
“plainly discriminate against interstate commerce,” the Court in 
Dean Milk v. Madison143 said that the state could not pursue 
even “its unquestioned power to protect the health and safety of 
its people, if reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives, 
adequate to conserve legitimate local interests, are available.”  
“Lesser impact” and “reasonable alternatives” appear similar in 
construct to the intermediate test.  In cases not involving 
discrimination, the Court will consider reasonable alternatives, 
and if there are reasonable alternatives without the same harm 
to interstate commerce, they will fail the “lesser impact” portion 
of the test.  The Court in Maine v. Taylor upheld a 
discriminatory law in large part because there were no 
reasonable alternatives.144 
 
IV. State regulations that discriminate against 
 interstate commerce 
 
A. Defining discrimination 
 
The Court summarized its rule against discrimination in 
United Haulers v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management in 
2007; “To determine whether a law violates this so-called 
“dormant” aspect of the Commerce Clause, we first ask whether 
it discriminates on its face against interstate commerce.  In this 
context, “discrimination” simply means differential treatment of 
in-state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the 
 
141. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (emphasis added) (citations 
omitted) (“To withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that 
classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and 
must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.”). Justice 
Douglas, discussing “substantial relationship” stated, “And the State cannot 
meet that burden without showing that a gender-neutral statute would be a 
less effective means of achieving that goal.” M. v. Superior Ct., 450 U.S. 464, 
490 (1981) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
142. The strict scrutiny compelling state interest test requires that a law 
be the least restrictive alternative. The rational basis permissive scrutiny test 
does not consider alternatives at all.  
143. Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, Wis., 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951) 
(emphasis added). 
144. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151(1986). 
38https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss1/2
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former and burdens the latter.”145  The Court in New Energy Co. 
of Indiana v. Limbach146 equated discrimination with “economic 
protectionism—that is, regulatory measures designed to benefit 
in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state 
competitors,” and concluded that “state statutes that clearly 
discriminate against interstate commerce are routinely struck 
down unless the discrimination is demonstrably justified by a 
valid factor unrelated to economic protectionism.”147 
Whatever the definition of “discrimination,” the most 
common phrase used by the Court to describe its approach to 
Dormant Commerce Clause discrimination issues is that state 
laws that discriminate against interstate commerce are 
“virtually per se invalid.”148 Pike v. Bruce Church was the first 
 
145. The definition of discrimination in United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. 
Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330 (2007) is derived 
from Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of State of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 
99 (1994); “As we use the term here, ‘discrimination’ simply means differential 
treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the 
former and burdens the latter.” The Court’s rules require that the party 
claiming discrimination bears the burden of proving it, but once discrimination 
is shown, the State has the burden of justifying it. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 
U.S. 322, 336 (1979) (citing Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm’n, 
432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977)), (“The burden to show discrimination rests on the 
party challenging the validity of the statute, but ‘[w]hen discrimination against 
commerce. . . is demonstrated, the burden falls on the State to justify it both 
in terms of the local benefits flowing from the statute and the unavailability of 
nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to preserve the local interests at 
stake.’”).  
146. New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273 (1988). 
Even a relatively straightforward discrimination case such as Limbach has its 
critics. Edward A. Zelinsky, Restoring Politics to the Commerce Clause: The 
Case for Abandoning the Dormant Commerce Clause Prohibition on 
Discriminatory Taxation, 29 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 29, 32–33 (2002), (“No decision 
of the Supreme Court better exemplifies the doctrinal problems of the dormant 
Commerce Clause nondiscrimination principle than New Energy Company of 
Indiana v. Limbach.”).  Professor Zelinsky is primarily concerned with the 
Court’s different treatment of discriminatory taxes versus its treatment of 
discriminatory subsidies. Id.  
147. New Energy Co., 486 U.S. at 273. Professor O’Grady argues that 
discrimination and economic protections are different concepts. Catherine 
Gage O’Grady, Targeting State Protectionism Instead of Interstate 
Discrimination Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
571, 587 (1997).  
148. Including Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 145 (1970), twenty-six 
Supreme Court Dormant Commerce Clause cases have used the phrase 
“virtually per se”; See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2091 
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case to use the adverb “virtually” as part of a Dormant 
Commerce Clause per se test; “Even where the State is pursuing 
a clearly legitimate local interest, this particular burden on 
commerce has been declared to be virtually per se illegal.”149  
Despite the seeming ease of the rule, the Court’s decisions as to 
discrimination are a morass.150  With the adverb “virtually” the 
 
(2018); Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 338 (2008) (Davis said 
that a virtually per se invalid discriminatory law “will survive only if it 
‘advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by 
reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives’ Oregon Waste.” Id. (citations 
omitted); Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 476, 125 S. Ct. 1885, 1897, (2005); 
Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 671 (2003) (Breyer, 
J., concurring); Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, Me., 
520 U.S. 564, 565 (1997); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 298 (1997); 
Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 331–32 (1996); Associated Indus. of 
Mo. v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641, 647 (1994); C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of 
Clarkstown, N.Y., 511 U.S. 383, 389–90 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring); Ore. 
Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of State of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994); 
Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 344, n. 6 (1992) (citations 
omitted) (the Court said, The “virtually per se rule of invalidity,” applies “not 
only to laws motivated solely by a desire to protect local industries from out-
of-state competition, but also to laws that respond to legitimate local concerns 
by discriminating arbitrarily against interstate trade.”); Wyoming v. 
Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454 (1992); Nw. Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. 
Comm’n of Kan., 489 U.S. 493, 523 (1989); New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 
486 U.S. 269, 279 (1988) (Limbach says that state laws requiring the “virtually 
per se” test may be a “fatal defect” or at least require strict scrutiny); Maine v. 
Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 148 (1986) (the Court offered an example of the rule—
“Shielding in-state industries from out-of-state competition is almost never a 
legitimate local purpose.”); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor 
Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986); S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 
U.S. 82, 100 (1984); White v. Mass. Council of Const. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 
204, 223 (1983) (Blackman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); 
Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp. of Del., 450 U.S. 662, 686 (1981) (Brennan, 
J., concurring on discrimination grounds as to the judgment; the majority 
opinion found an undue burden); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 
U.S. 456, 471(1981); Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 36 (1980); 
City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (only City of Philadelphia 
attempts any explanation of the phrase); Bos. Stock Exch. v. State Tax 
Comm’n, 429 U.S. 318, 336 (1977); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 
794, 821 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
149. Pike, 397 U.S. at 145 (emphasis added). 
150. Julian Cyril Zebot, Awakening A Sleeping Dog: An Examination of 
the Confusion in Ascertaining Purposeful Discrimination Against Interstate 
Commerce, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1063 (2002). (“As a legal doctrine, 
the dormant Commerce Clause has often proven to be a difficult specimen. In 
applying the doctrine, the Supreme Court has labeled it a ‘quagmire,’ ’not 
40https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss1/2
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rule against discrimination is anything but a clear and simple 
black and white rule.  Among the difficulties captured by that 
adverb, the line between the two seemingly very different tests—
the undue burdens balancing test and the per se discrimination 
test—became murky and obscure.151  But the qualifying adverb 
“virtually” did not cause the problem; rather the adverb is the 
shortcut reference to the fact that the Court has made the rule 
against discrimination unnecessarily complex.  The adverb is 
the Court’s “go to” reference to its Dormant Commerce Clause 
rule against discrimination, but the adverb substitutes jargon 
for any attempt to explain or defend the Court’s approach to 
state laws that discriminate against interstate commerce. 
As will be discussed later, there are cases where there is 
some difficulty in determining if there was discrimination, but 
those cases are not the biggest problem.  The Court’s approach 
to cases where the fact of discrimination is undeniable manages 
to complicate what should be simpler rules against local 
discrimination.  The Court seems to have lost sight of just how 
simple this rule should be.  Discrimination is classification based 
upon origin.152  It is “originism.”  It is as contrary to the Dormant 
Commerce Clause as racism and sexism are to the Equal 
Protection Clause.  Discrimination based upon origin means 
treating out of state commerce differently than in-state 
commerce because it is out of state.  It is economic protectionism 
designed to benefit in-state economic interest over out-of-state 
economic interests.  The Court has made a basic mistake in 
construing obvious discrimination as perhaps being part of a 
valid state concern, leading to the introduction of the adverb 
 
predictable,’ ‘hopelessly confused,’ and ‘not always . . . easy to follow.’”). 
Contra, Michael E. Smith, State Discriminations Against Interstate Commerce, 
74 CAL. L. REV. 1203, 1205 (1986) (“This Article contends that the Supreme 
Court’s rules concerning state discrimination against interstate commerce are 
reasonably clear; that they fit together and rest on tenable reasons; and that 
they have produced reasonably uniform results.”).  
151. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 
573, 579 (1986), (“We have also recognized that there is no clear line separating 
the category of state regulation that is virtually per se invalid under the 
Commerce Clause, and the category subject to the Pike v. Bruce 
Church balancing approach.”).  
152. C & A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 390 (“We have interpreted the Commerce 
Clause to invalidate local laws that impose commercial barriers or 
discriminate against an article of commerce by reason of its origin or 
destination out of State.”).  
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“virtually” to a per se test.  There is no part of a “per se” test that 
needs a modifier, let alone one as imprecise as “virtually.”153 
In truth, there are two lines of discrimination cases that 
parallel each other, those in which the state discrimination 
against interstate commerce is “per se” invalid and those in 
which the discrimination is “virtually per se” invalid.  In these 
latter cases, the Court will generally engage in some form of 
balancing, and thus I call the approach in these cases “virtually 
per se balancing.”  The Court itself has not acknowledged that it 
is applying two distinct tests.  In those lines of cases that apply 
the “per se” test, once the discrimination is found, all of the 
elements required for a violation of the Dormant Commerce 
Clause are presumed.  The law is found invalid.  No 
consideration is given to the state’s justification for its 
discrimination.  The state is given no chance to defend its 
discrimination.  The state can only hang is head, take its legal 
briefs back home, and try to come up with a better defense in the 
future. Occasionally, in these “per se” line of cases, the Court will 
say that it is applying a “per se” test, but just as often it will say 
 
153. Professor O’Grady points out the irony that Pike itself did not apply 
the “virtually per se” test to what appeared to be a discriminatory law. 
Catherine Gage O’Grady, Targeting State Protectionism Instead of Interstate 
Discrimination Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
571, 613 (1997); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970). In 
discrimination cases after Pike, not all of them used the “virtually per se” 
invalidity phrase. Id. In Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 375 
(1976), the Court conceded that a Mississippi bar of the sale of out of state milk 
unless the other state had a reciprocity clause effectively excluded the sales of 
out-of-state milk in Mississippi. The Court without any mention of 
discrimination or the “virtually per se” test concluded that the Mississippi law 
“unduly burdens the free flow of interstate commerce and cannot be justified 
as a permissible exercise of any state power.” Id. at 381. Again not using the 
“virtually per se” phrase, the Court in Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. 
Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 350 (1977), found that North Carolina’s law preventing 
the sale of apples in North Carolina with any quality grade other than 
applicable United States Department of Agriculture had “the practical effect 
of not only burdening interstate sales of Washington apples, but also 
discriminating against them.” The Court concluded, “When discrimination 
against commerce of the type we have found is demonstrated, the burden falls 
on the State to justify it both in terms of the local benefits flowing from the 
statute and the unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to 
preserve the local interests at stake.” Id. at 353.  
42https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss1/2
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that it is applying a “virtually per se” test.154  In another line of 
discrimination cases, the state discrimination is “virtually per 
se” invalid.  The State will offer some local self-interest in 
treating interstate commerce differently than in state 
commerce, and the Court will undertake some form of balancing 
before concluding that the law violates the Dormant Commerce 
Clause.  The Court may call this a “per se” test,155 but more likely 
a “virtually per se” test.  It does not matter what the test is 
called.  In the true “per se” line of cases, there will be no 
balancing.  In the true “virtually per se balancing” line of cases, 
there will be some type of balancing.  The distinction is not what 
the Court calls it, but rather whether the Court simply strikes 
the law down or engages in some form of balancing before likely 
striking it down. 
Just the one term between Wayfair in 2018, and Tennessee 
Wine in 2019, captures the divide in the Supreme Court as to the 
“per se” and what I call the “virtually per se balancing” test for 
state laws discriminating against interstate commerce.  The 
Court in Wayfair stated it bluntly, “[S]tate regulations may not 
discriminate against interstate commerce;”156 discriminatory 
state rules faced “a virtually per se rule of invalidity.”157  In the 
2019 term of the Court, Justice Alito in Tennessee Wine & Spirits 
Retailers v. Thomas suggested more of a balancing approach 
then a per se rule, that a state law discriminating against 
interstate commerce would be sustained only on a showing that 
it was “narrowly tailored to advance a legitimate local 
purpose.”158  In the case, “The State of Tennessee imposes 
demanding durational-residency requirements on all 
individuals and businesses seeking to obtain or renew a license 
 
154. See S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 100 (1984), 
where the Court found that Alaska’s requirement that timber taken from state 
lands be processed within the state a per se violation without any balancing, 
but it referred to the test as “the rule of virtual per se invalidity.”   
155. C & A Carbone, 511 U.S., at 392.  
156. South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2091 (2018) (citations 
omitted). 
157. Id. (citations omitted). To be fair, Wayfair was not a discrimination 
case, so no more complete statement of the rule against discrimination was 
necessarily called for. Id. Still, its summary statement made no mention of any 
balancing after a finding of discrimination.  Id.  
158. Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449, 
2461 (2019) (internal quotations and brackets omitted). 
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to operate a liquor store.”  The Court found the residency 
requirement “ill-suited to promote responsible sales and 
consumption practices but there are obvious alternatives that 
better serve that goal without discriminating against 
nonresidents.”159  Better, the Court finds discriminatory rules 
invalid simply because they are discriminatory without 
suggesting that the discrimination might be defended in some 
way.  This is a true “per se” approach.  Tennessee Wine required 
no more than that the law be narrowly tailored to advance some 
legitimate end.  This suggests, at best, an intermediate 
balancing test and, as discussed later, not even a strong version 
of an intermediate balancing test.  Now, in actual practice, as 
the Court did in Tennessee Wine, the Court will almost always 
find discriminatory laws invalid no matter which test is used. 
In short, no matter what the Court calls the test, there are 
“per se” cases where the Court will strike down a discriminatory 
law without any actual balancing of competing interests.  There 
are another group of “virtually per se balancing” cases where the 
Court will undertake some form of balancing. 
 
B. A “per se” approach to discrimination 
 
In the early cases, the Court seemed to see obvious 
discrimination for what it was.  Pennsylvania v. West Virginia160 
is typical of such an early discrimination case.  There, West 
Virginia, then the leading producer of natural gas in the United 
States but whose fields were in decline, required that gas 
companies meet the demands of all in-state customers before 
any natural gas could be imported into other states such as 
nearby Pennsylvania and Ohio.  The Court said that Dormant 
Commerce Clause principles were intended to protect interstate 
commerce “from invidious restraints” and “conflicting or hostile 
state laws.”161  The Court gave the basic rationale, “It means that 
in the matter of interstate commerce we are a single nation—
 
159. Id. at 2476 (parenthetical reference to dissenting opinion omitted). 
160. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923), aff’d sub nom. 
Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 263 U.S. 350 (1923). 
161. Id. at 596. The Court noted that what West Virginia might legally do 
“others may, and there are 10 states from which natural gas is exported for 
consumption in other states.” Id. 
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one and the same people.”162  Even with regard to a state power 
as comprehensive as the laying and collecting taxes, the State 
could not exercise that power “in a way which involves a 
discrimination against such commerce.”163 
West Virginia asserted that its supply was waning and that 
it could not meet both local needs and those in other states.  That 
made its law, West Virginia argued, “a legitimate measure of 
conservation in the interest of the people of the state,”164  that if 
natural gas companies “were permitted to carry gas into other 
states the supply would be speedily exhausted.”165  This is a 
common state’s justification for discrimination.166 
The Court’s response relied solely on a long quotation from 
a 1911 case, West v. Kansas Nat. Gas Co.,167  where Oklahoma 
law prevented pipelines from transmitting natural gas out of 
state.168  The West Court said Oklahoma’s claim that it had the 
right to conserve natural gas was not a claim of the right “to 
conserve” but “the right to reserve,” to reserve natural gas for 
state inhabitants now and in the future.169  The state’s 
conservation purpose was in fact a purpose to advance the 
“commercial, -the business welfare of the state.”170  If Oklahoma 
had the right to reserve its natural gas, the West Court 
continued, “Pennsylvania might keep its coal, the Northwest its 
 
162. Id. The Court continued, “All the states have assented to it, all are 
alike bound by it, and all are equally protected by it.” This is a nice point; 
sometimes the Dormant Commerce Clause limits a state, but sometimes it 
protects a state. 
163. Id. West Virginia, the Court said, was attempting to subvert 
commerce in natural gas in other states to “the local business within her 
borders”, “in effect an attempt to regulate the interstate business to the 
advantage of the local consumers.” Id. at 597, 597–98. The Court’s conclusion 
was firm: “But this she may not do.” Id. at 598. It would be no different, the 
Court reasoned, if the state instructed one of its railroads to “haul intrastate 
coal to the exclusion of interstate coal.” Id. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. 
166. See e.g., City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978), where New 
Jersey sought to protect its in-state landfills from being filled up by the 
exclusion of out of state waste, but it imposed no limits on in state waste. 
167. West v. Kan. Nat. Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911).  
168. Id. at 249–50. 
169. Id. at 250.  
170. Id. at 255. 
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timber, the mining states their minerals.”171  And as the West 
Court saw it, the slippery slope would be worse from there, “To 
what consequences does such power tend? If one state has it, all 
states have it; embargo may be retaliated by embargo, and 
commerce will be halted at state lines.”172  But the Commerce 
Clause, not the welfare of individual states, the West Court 
continued, was to be preeminent and that benefited all of the 
states, “[T]he welfare of all of the States and that of each State 
is made the greater by a division of its resources, natural and 
created, with every other State, and those of every other State 
with it.”173  Pennsylvania v. West Virginia quoted in full this 
reasoning of the West Court for good reason;174  few cases have 
stated better than the West Court the importance of preventing 
a state from favoring its own citizens over those of other states.  
We are the United States; we stand or fall together. 
There are many modern cases that follow the per se 
approach of the Pennsylvania v. West Virginia case, including 
perhaps the most noteworthy Philadelphia v. New Jersey.175  The 
 
171. Id. In my own courses, I claim that if Texas tried to keep its gasoline 
to itself, then California could say to Texas, “Okay; no more raisins for you! 
Let’s see how you like your ‘Bran’ cereal.”  California Raisins, 
https://calraisins.org/about/the-raisin-industry/ (last visited Sept. 14, 2019) 
(“On approximately 200,000 acres, the 2,000 California Raisin growers produce 
100% of the U.S. raisins, totaling approximately 300,000 tons annually in an 
area within a 60 mile radius of Fresno, California – known as the central San 
Joaquin Valley.”).   
172. Kan. Nat. Gas Co., 221 U.S. at 255.  
173. Id.  
174. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 599–600 (1923). 
175. City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).  There are a 
number of other true “per se” cases where the Court does no balancing. See W. 
Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994) (the Court struck down as 
discriminatory a Massachusetts assessment on all fluid milk sold by dealers to 
Massachusetts retailers, two-thirds of them out of state, but the entire 
assessment was distributed to Massachusetts dairy farmers. The Court found 
that the purpose was to allow higher cost in-state dairies to compete with 
lower-cost out of state dairies.); Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437 (1992) 
(the Court found that Oklahoma’s requirement that all coal-fired electric 
generating plants in Oklahoma use at least 10% Oklahoma coal discriminated 
against Wyoming coal producers. The evidence showed that the law “on its face 
and in practical effect” discriminated. Id. at 455. The Court held, “Such a 
preference for coal from domestic sources cannot be characterized as anything 
other than protectionist and discriminatory, for the Act purports to exclude 
coal mined in other States based solely on its origin.” Id. Oklahoma’s defense 
that it was taking only a “small portion” led the Court to quote one of its then 
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recent cases, “Varying the strength of the bar against economic protectionism 
according to the size and number of in-state and out-of-state firms affected 
would serve no purpose except the creation of new uncertainties in an already 
complex field.” Id. at 456 (quoting New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S., at 
276–77). The Court gave some serious shade to Oklahoma’s attempt to defend 
its discrimination, “We have often examined a ‘presumably legitimate goal,’ 
only to find that the State attempted to achieve it by ‘the illegitimate means of 
isolating the State from the national economy.’” Id. at 456–57. And Oklahoma 
proved that it deserved the shade by offering one of the lamest defenses of 
discrimination in any case by claiming that it was only helping Wyoming 
conserve its cleaner coal for Wyoming’s future use. Id. at 547. Wyoming was 
able to show fairly convincingly that it did not need Oklahoma’s help, that it 
had enough of its cleaner coal for the next several hundreds of years. Id. The 
Court did not balance in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984) 
(where the Court struck down Hawaii’s 20% excise tax on sale of liquor at 
wholesale, except for okeolehao, a brandy made from the ti plant, an 
indigenous plant also used to make hula skirts, and pineapple wine, two wines 
likely made only in Hawaii (if at all). Hawaii argued for an application of the 
undue burdens balancing test since its purpose was to encourage “struggling” 
local wine production not to discriminate against wine from other states.  Id. 
at 272.  The Court would have none of it, finding both discrimination in purpose 
and effect, “[I]t is irrelevant to the Commerce Clause inquiry that the 
motivation of the legislature was the desire to aid the makers of the locally 
produced beverage rather than to harm out-of-state producers.” Id. at 273. The 
State, of course, could encourage its domestic industry, the Court said, but not 
contrary to the Commerce Clause, “One of the fundamental purposes of the 
Clause “was to insure. . . against discriminating State legislation.” Id. at 271. 
Another straightforward case for the Court was S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. 
Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984) where the Court found that Alaska’s 
requirement that timber taken from state lands be processed within the state, 
was “a naked restraint on export of unprocessed logs.” Id. at 99. It said that 
such a law could not “survive scrutiny” under the Court’s precedents and 
concluded “that it falls within the rule of virtual per se invalidity of laws that 
‘bloc[k] the flow of interstate commerce at a State’s borders.’” Id. at 100 
(citations omitted). Alaska wrongly believed that its law fell within the 
“market participant” exception.  Id. at 98. One of the straightforward Supreme 
Court per se discrimination cases is New England Power Co. v. New 
Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 (1982) (New Hampshire disallowed the exportation 
of hydroelectricity generated by one of its many rivers, a particularly cheap 
and clean form of energy.  Id. at 339. The Court identified “preferred right of 
access” as a classic form of discrimination. Id. at 338. New Hampshire was 
open about its purpose to “reserve for its own citizens the ‘economic benefit’ of 
such hydroelectric power,” because it wrongly believed that federal law 
permitted the discrimination. Id. at 333, 342–43.  This openness made the case 
one of the few actually involving “simple economic protectionism.” Id. at 339); 
Maryland v. Louisiana 451 U.S. 725, 728 (1981) (where the Court struck down 
a discriminatory Louisiana tax on natural gas taken from U.S. territorial 
waters in the Gulf of Mexico.  The Court said, “A state tax must be assessed in 
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Court in 1978 in Philadelphia v. New Jersey barred most out of 
state waste from landfills in New Jersey.176  The Court 
summarized its rules, “The crucial inquiry, therefore, must be 
directed to determining whether [the state landfill law] is 
basically a protectionist measure, or whether it can fairly be 
viewed as a law directed to legitimate local concerns, with effects 
upon interstate commerce that are only incidental.”177  New 
Jersey said its purpose was to protect the environment by 
extending the lifespan of its current landfills.  The Court said 
that it did not matter what New Jersey’s purpose was; under the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, “the evil of protectionism can reside 
in legislative means as well as legislative ends.178  Even 
assuming a valid New Jersey purpose, “it may not be 
accomplished by discriminating against articles of commerce 
coming from outside the State unless there is some reason, apart 
from their origin, to treat them differently.”179  It could be 
accepted that New Jersey was legitimately concerned about 
overcapacity in its landfills, but even accepting that as a 
legitimate purpose, New Jersey also had as its purpose to 
discriminate against interstate commerce in addressing the 
environmental issue.  As the Court put it, “On its face, it imposes 
 
light of its actual effect considered in conjunction with other provisions of the 
State’s tax scheme. ‘In each case it is our duty to determine whether the statute 
under attack, whatever its name may be, will in its practical operation work 
discrimination against interstate commerce.’”)  Id. at 756. 
176. There were a number of other landfill cases where City of Phila. v. 
New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) was followed, including in a Michigan case, 
Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Mich. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 504 U.S. 353 
(1992), where each Michigan county was allowed to exclude waste from other 
counties within the state as well as interstate. In Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. 
Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 343 (1992), decided the same day as Fort Gratiot, the Court 
struck down on discrimination grounds Alabama’s higher fees for disposal of 
hazardous out of state waste then such in state waste. Although Justice 
Thomas for the Court in Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of State 
of Or., 511 U.S. 93 (1994), came close to balancing when he engaged in an 
extensive discussion as to whether the state had justified a discriminatory 
pricing structure for disposal of out of state waste in Oregon, the Court’s 
conclusion was that the state law was “facially invalid.” Id. at 108.  
177. City of Phila., 437 U.S. at 624. 
178. Id. at 626.  As the Court said after listing the kinds of states acts 
found to be discriminatory in the past, “In each of these cases, a presumably 
legitimate goal was sought to be achieved by the illegitimate means of isolating 
the State from the national economy.” Id. at 627. 
179. Id. at 626–27.  
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on out-of-state commercial interests the full burden of 
conserving the State’s remaining landfill space.” Other than 
origin, there was no reason to exclude all Philadelphia garbage 
and accept all New Jersey garbage.180 
The New Jersey law was not like a valid quarantine law 
where the state was trying to keep out some diseased commodity 
because it was diseased.  A ton of either Philadelphia or New 
Jersey garbage took up exactly the same space in the landfill.  
New Jersey, the Court said, could address the issue by “slowing 
the flow of all waste into the State’s remaining landfills.”181  For 
example, the state could require that all waste, in state and out 
of state, be sorted so that no recyclables were placed in the 
landfills.  That incidental impact on out of state waste might 
lead to an undue burdens challenge, but it would not be 
discriminatory.182 
For the Philadelphia Court, the New Jersey’s law, however 
admirable, its underlying purpose was not shown to be “apart 
from their origin.”183 It was “economic isolation,”184 and 
“protectionist,”185 in that it put the full burden of the 
conservation program on interstate commerce, not because it 
was different but because it was interstate commerce.  That is 
 
180. The Court in a later landfill case following City of Phila. v. New 
Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) was even more direct. See Chem. Waste Mgmt., 
Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 343 (1992) (emphasis in the original), where 
Alabama tried to justify higher fees imposed on out of state companies for 
disposal of hazardous then for in state companies by listing all of the dangers 
of hazardous waste, but that justification did not go to the difference between 
in state and out of state hazardous waste; “These may all be legitimate local 
interests, and petitioner has not attacked them. But only rhetoric, and not 
explanation, emerges as to why Alabama targets only interstate hazardous 
waste to meet these goals.” 
181. City of Phila., 437 U.S. at 626. 
182. For an example of a case where an evenhanded burden was imposed 
to protect landfills, Al Turi Landfill, Inc. v. Goshen, 556 F. Supp. 231, 238 
(S.D.N.Y. 1982), aff’d, 697 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1982), the Court stated “The most 
significant factor leading to this conclusion is that the Ordinance is not 
directed towards landfills that accept refuse originating outside of the Town or 
the State. Rather, it is a non-discriminatory, across-the-board limitation on the 
construction or expansion of all landfills within the Town.”.  
183. City of Phila., 437 U.S. at 626–27. The Court concluded on this count, 
“Both on its face and in its plain effect, [the New Jersey landfill law] violates 
this principle of nondiscrimination.” Id. at 626.  
184. Id. at 623. 
185. Id. at 628. 
49
2019 THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE 93 
the very definition of discrimination; it was “virtually per se 
invalid,” and there was no need for any type of balancing.  No 
matter what the Court called it, the case was an application of a 
“per se” approach. 
States almost always have a good reason for discriminating 
against interstate commerce, which partially shields its 
economic protectionism, but if the reason does not go to some 
difference between in state and out of state, it should be 
nonetheless per se invalid.  Sometimes the Court recognizes this 
as they did in Philadelphia v. New Jersey.  The state, the Court 
said, cannot impose a disproportionate burden on an out-of-state 
interest even in the pursuit of an otherwise valid interest.  Out-
of-state interests bore a disproportionate burden in advancing a 
New Jersey interest.  That is the very essence of economic 
protectionism, no matter the validity of the underlying 
environmental interest.  In other cases, the Court will undertake 
a “virtually per se balancing” approach, which only confuses the 
issue. 
 
C. The “virtually per se balancing” approach in discrimination 
cases 
 
In many of the other more modern cases, the Court has 
made a simple test difficult by letting claims of valid state 
interests distract it from the simple economic discrimination.  
Dean Milk v. Madison,186 decided in 1952 just a few years after 
Southern Pacific, is the best example of the Court becoming 
distracted by this sleight of hand.  Dean Milk in effect, though 
not in words, introduced the “virtually per se balancing” test to 
the Dormant Commerce Clause cases.  In Dean Milk, a local 
statute limited milk sold for human consumption in Madison, 
Wisconsin to milk from cows within twenty-five miles of Madison 
and pasteurized within five miles of Madison.187  The end result 
 
186. Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).   
187. Id. Since the Court struck down the law because of the five-mile rule, 
it did not discuss the twenty-five-mile rule, which was even more restrictive. 
Id. In theory, an out of state dairy company could have its milk pasteurized 
within five miles of Madison. Id.  The twenty-five-mile rule required that the 
milk come from herds inspected by Madison inspectors and, in effect, limited 
inspection to herds within twenty-five miles of Madison. Id. Out of state firms 
could not comply with this rule. Id.  
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was that milk from Dean Milk’s Illinois dairy herds was 
excluded from the Madison market. Madison was engaged in 
clear and obvious discrimination,188 but after a statement of the 
facts, the Court telegraphed its intention to apply an undue 
burdens balancing test, “Upon these facts we find it necessary to 
determine only the issue raised under the Commerce Clause, for 
we agree with appellant that the ordinance imposes an undue 
burden on interstate commerce.”189  There was no mention of the 
Southern Pacific balancing approach, but neither did the Court 
rely on a finding of per se invalid discrimination. What seemed 
to be controlling was that Madison claimed it was concerned 
about its healthy supply of milk, or as the Court put it, “Nor can 
there be objection to the avowed purpose of this enactment.”190  
 
The Court then turned from the city’s non-objectionable 
purpose to the effect of the law and compared it to Baldwin v. 
Seelig,191 where New York fixed the minimum price at which 
milk dealers had to pay both in and out of state farmers. The 
Court said that the Madison regulation, like that in Baldwin, 
had “in practical effect” excluded wholesome Illinois milk from 
being sold in Madison.192  The Court was blunt that Madison was 
“erecting an economic barrier protecting a major local industry 
against competition from without the State,” that “Madison 
“plainly discriminates against interstate commerce.”193  But that 
was the intended purpose of the law, not just the effect of an 
 
188. Regan, supra note 34, at 1229 (“The crucial point is that the 
ordinance in Dean Milk is an explicit embargo, or the equivalent of an explicit 
embargo.”). 
189. Dean Milk Co., 340 U.S. at 353. 
190. Id. (emphasis added). 
191. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935). 
192. Dean Milk Co., 340 U.S. at 354.   
193. Id.  In a footnote to its comment about the discrimination, the Court 
said, “It is immaterial that Wisconsin milk from outside the Madison area is 
subjected to the same proscription as that moving in interstate commerce.” Id. 
at 354, n.4.  The fact that Madison also discriminated against dairy cattle from 
other parts of Wisconsin would not violate the Dormant Commerce Clause, but 
neither would discrimination against in state interest immunize Madison from 
it’s out of state discrimination. Regan, supra note 34, at 1230 (“A government 
cannot validate discrimination against a protected class (in this case non-
Wisconsin firms) simply by subjecting some members of the non-protected 
class to the same burden.”).  In a balancing test, the fact that the burden fell 
on both in state and out of state would have been a relevant factor.  
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otherwise innocent regulation of a local problem.  The Court 
even openly recognized the fallacy of its reasoning that the 
claimed purpose might somehow insulate a law.  That an 
“ordinance is valid simply because it professes to be a health 
measure” would make the Commerce Clause meaningless “save 
for the rare instance where a state artlessly discloses an avowed 
purpose to discriminate against interstate goods.”194  Still the 
 
194. Dean Milk Co., 340 U.S. at 354.  In later cases, the Supreme Court 
reaffirmed that the state’s claimed purpose was not controlling, “Furthermore, 
when considering the purpose of a challenged statute, this Court is not bound 
by the name, description or characterization given it by the legislature or the 
courts of the State, but will determine for itself the practical impact of the law.”  
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979) (citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks, ellipsis, and brackets omitted). Justice Powell, in a 
concurring opinion to a later case, cited Dean Milk for the proposition that the 
Court was not required to accept pretextual purposes, “Commerce Clause 
analysis differs from analysis under the “rational basis” test. Under the 
Commerce Clause, a court is empowered to disregard a legislature’s statement 
of purpose if it considers it a pretext.”  Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 
449 U.S. 456, 476 n.2 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring).  But, the claimed purpose 
not being controlling was not a new concept.  See Foster-Fountain Packing Co. 
v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 10 (1928) (“One challenging the validity of a state 
enactment on the ground that it is repugnant to the commerce clause is not 
necessarily bound by the legislative declarations of purpose. It is open to him 
to show that in their practical operation its provisions directly burden or 
destroy interstate commerce.”).  See also Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313, 
319 (1890) (“There may be no purpose upon the part of a legislature to violate 
the provisions of that instrument, and yet a statute enacted by it, under the 
forms of law, may, by its necessary operation, be destructive of rights granted 
or secured by the constitution.”).  The Barber Court said that as a “principle of 
constitutional interpretation” “in whatever language a statute may be framed, 
its purpose must be determined by its natural and reasonable effect.”  Id. 
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  In Barber, Minnesota 
required that meat sold for human consumption within the state of Minnesota 
had to be butchered within twenty-four hours of its sale, which in effect 
required that all out of state cattle be butchered in the state of Minnesota.  The 
Court did not mince words, stating that: 
 
Our duty to maintain the constitution will not permit us to 
shut our eyes to these obvious and necessary results of the 
Minnesota statute. If this legislation does not make such 
discrimination against the products and business of other 
states in favor of the products and business of Minnesota as 
interferes with and burdens commerce among the several 
states, it would be difficult to enact legislation that would 
have that result.   
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Court did not make the obvious conclusion that Madison’s claim 
of a health concern was patently bogus and its true 
discriminatory purpose was contrary to the Dormant Commerce 
Clause.  There was no need to consider the effect of the law—it 
had a discriminatory purpose and was invalid for that reason 
alone.  As to the law’s discriminatory effect, the Court in 
summary fashion applied an undue burden balancing 
approach.195  The Court ruled that even in the pursuit of a valid 
local health interest, the state could not discriminate against 
interstate commerce “if reasonable nondiscriminatory 
alternatives, adequate to conserve legitimate local interests, are 
available.”  The Court said that the issue was “whether the 
discrimination inherent in the Madison ordinance can be 
justified in view of the character of the local interests and the 
available methods of protecting them.”196 
In applying the “reasonable alternatives” part of the test, 
the Court easily found that there were alternatives to the 
requirement that all milk for Madison be pasteurized within 
five-miles of Madison; the state could rely on out of state 
inspections that were consistent with federal rules, and even 
higher standard than that of Madison.  The Court’s conclusion 
was strongly against discrimination, “To permit Madison to 
adopt a regulation not essential for the protection of local health 
interests and placing a discriminatory burden on interstate 
commerce would invite a multiplication of preferential trade 
 
Id. at 323.  
195. Professor Regan calls this “protectionist effect balancing” and 
explains why it might be tempting: 
 
If we distrust the courts’ ability to ascertain legislative 
purpose, or if we think inquiry into purpose is improper for 
some other reason, we might 
recommend protectionist effect balancing as a rule of 
decision that would approximate the results of successful 
inquiry into purpose while avoiding some of the attendant 
problems.  
 
Regan, supra note 34, at 1103, 1106.  What Professor Regan calls “protectionist 
effect balancing” bears some close resemblance to what I call “virtually per se 
balancing.”  Id. at 1103.  It is, however, not clear to me that the Court limits 
its use of the balancing test in discrimination cases only to those instances 
involving discriminatory effect.  
196. Dean Milk Co., 340 U.S. at 354. 
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areas destructive of the very purpose of the Commerce 
Clause.”197  But despite this clear statement against 
discrimination, the Court had introduced a balancing approach, 
and the damage was done.198  Because the state had claimed a 
valid local interest, the Court without seeming to recognize what 
it was doing had converted a case involving per se invalid 
discrimination into a case requiring very much the same kind of 
balancing as the undue burdens test, though with an emphasis 
on reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives as part of that 
balance.  There is no exact pattern, but it appears that in cases 
involving discrimination where the state asserts a valid purpose, 
the Court is likely to engage in some type of balancing.199 
Many discrimination cases after Dean Milk followed its 
approach, applying a “virtually per se balancing” test to a case 
involving discrimination.200  Perhaps the most famous of the 
 
197. Id. at 356.  
198. Professor McGreal has a unique position, “Dean Milk is important 
because it is the first dormant Commerce Clause antidiscrimination case to 
drop the focus on harm to the national economy.”  Paul E. McGreal, The Flawed 
Economics of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1191, 
1224 (1998).  His article argues that not all discrimination against interstate 
commerce has an impact on the national economy, and only laws that hurt the 
national economy ought to violate the Dormant Commerce Clause.  See Camps 
Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 581–83 (1997), 
which seems to support Professor McGreal’s theory.  The state of Maine gave 
a property tax exemption to state based charities, but only if they served 
primarily in-state residents.  Id. The charity in the case treated inner-city kids, 
primarily from other states, to the glories of outdoor life in Maine, America’s 
vacationland. Id. It is hard to see how Maine’s obvious discrimination against 
out of state persons hurt the national economy or any other Dormant 
Commerce Clause interest. It is also hard to believe that Maine thinks “Dirigo,” 
either Latin for “I lead” or the name of an obscure Quentin Tarantino movie, 
is a better state motto than “America’s Vacationland”, 
https://www.inspirational-quotes-short-funny-stuff.com/maine-state-
motto.html. 
199. The state is likely to assert some valid underlying purpose in every 
case except those where it believes that it is exempt from the normal rules such 
as the Market Participant exception or the congressional approval exception 
type of case.  See S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984), 
where the state of Alaska unsuccessfully claimed both of these defenses. 
200. This approach is not to be confused with the normal approach that 
even if a law adversely impacting interstate commerce is found not to be 
discriminatory, it still must pass the undue burdens test.  See Nw. Cent. 
Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm’n of Kan., 489 U.S. 493, 525 (1989), where 
the Court concluded that Kansas’s regulation did not violate either part of the 
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cases following the Dean Milk approach was Pike v. Bruce 
Church,201 although Pike did not actually cite to Dean Milk.  In 
Pike, the State of Arizona required that all cantaloupes grown in 
Arizona had to be packed in Arizona.  Bruce Church processed 
its Parker, Arizona-grown cantaloupes in Blythe, California, just 
thirty-one miles to the west, where they were sorted, inspected, 
packed and shipped in containers bearing the name of their 
California shipper, not the state of Arizona. It would cost Bruce 
Church $200,000 to build a packing shed in Parker.  Arizona 
“stipulated that its primary purpose is to promote and preserve 
the reputation of Arizona growers by prohibiting deceptive 
packaging.”202  By “deceptive,” Arizona meant that consumers 
were deceived into believing that Arizona’ cantaloupes came 
from California, not that the packaging contained any false 
claims as to the quality of cantaloupes. 
It seems that Bruce Church’s Parker, Arizona-grown 
cantaloupes were “of exceptionally high quality,”203 and Arizona 
wanted them identified on the packing labels as being from 
Arizona, not from California.  The Court accepted Arizona’s 
claim that it had a legitimate interest in protecting its 
reputation for having superior cantaloupe,204 but balancing the 
competing interests, it called the state interest “tenuous”205 and 
 
Dormant Commerce Clause.  “Even if not per se unconstitutional, a state law 
may violate the Commerce Clause if it fails to pass muster under the balancing 
test outlined in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.”  Id. (emphasis in original). 
201. E.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).  
202. Id. at 143.   
203. Id. at 144. 
204. A 1915 Supreme Court Dormant Commerce Clause case had 
recognized the validity of a state’s interest in protecting the reputation of an 
important commodity.  See Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52, 61 (1915), where 
Florida excluded less than perfect citrus products from interstate shipment, 
which lowered the supply and drove up the interstate price.  
 
We may take judicial notice of the fact that the raising of 
citrus fruits is one of the great industries of the state of 
Florida. It was competent for the legislature to find that it 
was essential for the success of that industry that its 
reputation be preserved in other states wherein such fruits 
find their most extensive market.   
 
Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52, 61 (1915). 
205. Pike, 397 U.S. at 145. 
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“minimal at best.”206  The Court said that it was more concerned 
about “the nature”207 of the injury to interstate commerce than 
the extent of the $200,000 cost to Bruce Church.  As for the 
“nature,” the Court said that it viewed with “particular suspicion 
state statutes requiring business operations to be performed in 
the home State that could more efficiently be performed 
elsewhere.”208  The Court continued, “Even where the State is 
pursuing a clearly legitimate local interest, this particular 
burden on commerce has been declared to be virtually per se 
illegal.”209  It then concluded that the impact on interstate 
commerce “could perhaps be tolerated if a more compelling state 
interest were involved.”210 
Pike has all the sins of Dean Milk, perhaps even 
compounded.  The Court recognized that Arizona was trying to 
keep the packing business in Arizona, but it felt compelled to 
except Arizona’s claim that it was concerned about protecting its 
reputation for quality cantaloupes.211  The frivolous nature of 
that assertion was surely enough for the Court to acknowledge 
that Arizona was just engaged in keeping a business within the 
state, what the Court in past cases had labeled clear 
discrimination against interstate commerce.212  But like Dean 
Milk, in the face of a claimed valid state purpose, the Court 
undertook a superficial balance before finding the law invalid.213  
 
206. Id. at 146. 
207. Id. at 145. 
208. Id. 
209. Id. (emphasis added). 
210. Id. at 146 (emphasis added) (The Court somewhat generously called 
the impact of the state law on interstate commerce the “incidental consequence 
of a regulatory scheme.”) 
211. See Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 145 (1970), where the Court 
seemed a bit peevish in suggesting that Arizona appeared to be claiming the 
superiority of Bruce Church’s Parker, Arizona cantaloupes for all of Arizona 
cantaloupes. 
212. Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928).   
213. See also Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 
350 (1977), where the Court said that the District Court had “correctly found, 
the challenged statute has the practical effect of not only burdening interstate 
sales of Washington apples, but also discriminating against them.” In Hunt, a 
North Carolina law prevented apples sold in North Carolina from having any 
grading references other than the ones required by federal law. Id. North 
Carolina had no state grading. Id. This took away a marketing advantage from 
Washington apples, which had extensive Washington state ratings as to 
quality. Id. The Court said that despite the facial neutrality of North Carolina’s 
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It included in the balance that the “nature” of the burden on 
interstate commerce was important.  Even if a state law was not 
discriminatory, the fact that it was of that nature was part of the 
balancing.  The case contributed “virtually per se” and 
“compelling state interest” to the Dormant Commerce Clause 
vocabulary, but only the former stuck.  The Pike Court’s use of 
the phrase “compelling state interest” has not carried the day in 
other Dormant Commerce Clause cases.214  The “compelling 
 
laws, some evidence “suggests that its discriminatory impact on interstate 
commerce was not an unintended byproduct and there are some indications in 
the record to that effect.” Id. at 352.  Nonetheless, the Court did not feel the 
need to ascribe to North Carolina “an economic protection motive.” Id.  Even if 
the law was passed for the valid 
 
declared purpose of protecting consumers from deception and 
fraud in the marketplace. . .discrimination against commerce 
of the type we have found is demonstrated, the burden falls 
on the State to justify it both in terms of the local benefits 
flowing from the statute and the unavailability of 
nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to preserve the 
local interests at stake. 
 
 Id. at 352–53 (citations omitted).  The Court then undertook an undue burdens 
balancing approach and found the marginal state interests outweighed by the 
harm to interstate commerce. Id. 
214. Hunt, 432 U.S. 333.  In the fifty Supreme Court cases that cite to 
Pike, not one uses the term “compelling state interest.”  The First Circuit 
recognized this in a case involving discrimination against interstate commerce, 
stating that:  
 
Though this standard is stringent, it is also quite different 
from a standard requiring the state to demonstrate a 
‘compelling state interest’ that cannot be served through a 
non-discriminatory alternative.  We reject plaintiffs’ 
contention that the ‘compelling interest’ standard applies 
here and is required by Maine v. Taylor.  Maine v. 
Taylor, like subsequent Supreme Court precedents, required 
states to demonstrate only that the statute ‘serves a 
legitimate local purpose’ that ‘could not be served as well by 
available non-discriminatory means.’  
 
Family Winemakers of Cal. v. Jenkins, 592 F.3d 1, 9 n.8 (1st Cir. 2010) 
(citations omitted).   
 
A few lower courts have applied the compelling state interest test.  Starlight 
Sugar Inc. v. Soto, 909 F. Supp. 853, 858 (D.P.R. 1995), aff’d, 114 F.3d 330 (1st 
Cir. 1997) (“Under this approach, courts must first determine if a state’s 
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state interest” term is consistent with the claim of “strict 
scrutiny” for discriminatory laws, but as discussed elsewhere, 
the Court tends to use what is at best an intermediate test, not 
a compelling state interest test. 
In 1979, in Hughes v. Oklahoma,215 the Court also used a 
“virtually per se balancing” test; “[W]hen discrimination against 
commerce is demonstrated, the burden falls on the State to 
justify it both in terms of the local benefits flowing from the 
statute and the unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternatives 
adequate to preserve the local interests at stake.”216  The Court 
struck down an Oklahoma law that prevented the shipping of 
minnows from Oklahoma streams to other states for resale, such 
 
regulation discriminates on its face by giving economic protection to in-state 
entities at the expense of out-of-state entities.  If so, the statute is deemed per 
se invalid, justifiable only by a compelling state interest.”). The Court of 
Appeals in Starlight Sugar affirmed but did not use the “compelling state 
interest” term: “[F]acially discriminatory regulations are presumptively 
invalid and are routinely struck down, unless it can be shown that they serve 
a legitimate local interest unrelated to economic protectionism—an interest, 
furthermore, that cannot be served through non-discriminatory means.”  
Starlight Sugar, Inc. v. Soto, 114 F.3d 330, 331–32 (citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Another District Court found that the compelling 
state interest test was required but found it satisfied since the state interest 
passed the Pike balancing test, “Regulation of commercial debt collection 
practices is a sufficiently compelling state interest to meet the Pike balancing 
test, and consequently, justifies the state’s adopted policy.”  Dun & Bradstreet, 
Inc. v. McEldowney, 564 F. Supp. 257, 263–64 (D. Idaho 1983); Can Mfrs. Inst., 
Inc. v. State, 289 N.W.2d 416, 421 (Minn. 1979). (“The environmental interests 
in this case clearly involve compelling state interests reasonably analogous to 
safety regulations.”).  
215. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).  Hughes is also 
noteworthy for Justice Brennan’s widely quoted defense of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause,  
 
The few simple words of the Commerce Clause—’The 
Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce . . . 
among the several States . . .’ —reflected a central concern of 
the Framers that was an immediate reason for calling the 
Constitutional Convention: the conviction that in order to 
succeed, the new Union would have to avoid the tendencies 
toward economic Balkanization that had plagued relations 
among the Colonies and later among the States under the 
Articles of Confederation.  
 
Id. at 325.  
216. Id. at 336 (internal quotation marks, ellipsis, and brackets omitted).   
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as to Hughes who operated a commercial minnow business in 
Wichita Falls, Texas.  The Court found that the Oklahoma law 
“on its face discriminates against interstate commerce.”217  The 
Court said, “[F]acial discrimination by itself may be a fatal 
defect, regardless of the State’s purpose, because ‘the evil of 
protectionism can reside in legislative means as well as 
legislative ends.’”218  But the Court had an alternative test, “At 
a minimum such facial discrimination invokes the strictest 
scrutiny of any purported legitimate local purpose and of the 
absence of nondiscriminatory alternatives.”219 
The Court in Hughes said that Oklahoma’s conservation 
claim “may well qualify as a legitimate local purpose,”220 but 
instead of choosing the “least discriminatory alternative” 
Oklahoma chose “to ‘conserve’ its minnows in the way that most 
overtly discriminates against interstate commerce.”  Oklahoma 
did not limit at all the use of in-state minnows but prevented 
almost all commercial transportations of minnows out of state.  
Instead of choosing discrimination against interstate commerce 
as a “last ditch” method after nondiscriminatory alternatives 
had failed, it chose the most discriminatory methods when there 
were likely nondiscriminatory alternatives.221 
The Court in Hughes did not help the problem by calling its 
 
217. Id. The Court reversed as no longer good law an 1896 case, Geer v. 
Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896), which allowed states to discriminate in favor 
of in-state citizens as to game birds, and presumably other natural resources 
based upon the fiction that the State owned all of the natural resources in the 
state.  Hughes, 441 U.S. 322 at 325.  
218. Id. at 337. 
219. Id.  
220. Id. 
221. Id. at 338. See Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27 (1980), 
where the Court struck down Florida’s ban on out of state bank holding 
companies from having separate investment banking subsidiaries but allowed 
in state banks to have such services.  The lower court had struck the law down 
on discrimination grounds. Id. The Supreme Court said that it did not need to 
“render the Florida legislation per se invalid” because it was “convinced that 
the disparate treatment of out-of-state bank holding companies cannot be 
justified as an incidental burden necessitated by legitimate local concerns.”  Id. 
at 42.  The Court recognized the validity of the claimed state interests, 
“Discouraging economic concentration and protecting the citizenry against 
fraud are undoubtedly legitimate state interests.” Id. at 43. But there was no 
reason to believe that out of state bank holding companies were more likely 
than in state bank holding companies “to engage in sharp practices than bank 
holding companies that are locally based.” Id.  
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approach “strictest scrutiny.”222  Hughes did not attempt to 
 
222.  Thirty-seven Supreme Court cases have cited to Hughes, and eight 
of those cases have quoted some version of the “strictest scrutiny” test.  See 
Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 144–45 (1986) (citations deleted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (“Although the proffered justification for any local 
discrimination against interstate commerce must be subjected to 
the strictest scrutiny, the empirical component of that scrutiny, like any other 
form of factfinding, is the basic responsibility of district courts, rather than 
appellate courts.”); Sporhase v. Nebraska, ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 958 
(1982) (“The reciprocity requirement does not survive the ‘strictest scrutiny’ 
reserved for facially discriminatory legislation.”).  The Court in Maine v. Taylor 
also referred to “more demanding scrutiny.” Id. at 138. See also United Haulers 
Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 366–
67 (2007) (Alito, J., dissenting) (Justice Alito was joined by Justice Stevens and 
Justice Kennedy) (“Thus, if the legislative means are themselves 
discriminatory, then regardless of how legitimate and nonprotectionist the 
underlying legislative goals may be, the legislation is subject to strict 
scrutiny.”); Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, Me., 520 
U.S. 564, 581–83 (1997) (citations omitted),  
 
We recognize that the Town might have attempted to defend 
the Maine law under the per se rule by demonstrating that it 
“‘advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be 
adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory 
alternatives.’”  In assessing respondents’ arguments, we 
would have applied our “strictest scrutiny.”  This is an 
extremely difficult burden, “so heavy that ‘facial 
discrimination by itself may be a fatal defect.’” (“Once a state 
tax is found to discriminate against out-of-state commerce, it 
is typically struck down without further inquiry”). Perhaps 
realizing the weight of its burden, the Town has made no 
effort to defend the statute under the per se rule, and so we 
do not address this question;  
 
Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 344, 796 (1996) (the Court 
rejected the state’s claim that its discriminatory tax was 
compensatory like use taxes.); Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. 
Quality of State of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 100–01 (1994) (citations omitted). 
 
Because the Oregon surcharge is discriminatory, the 
virtually per se rule of invalidity provides the proper legal 
standard here, not the Pike balancing test. As a result, the 
surcharge must be invalidated unless respondents can 
‘sho[w]  that it advances a legitimate local purpose that 
cannot be adequately served by reasonable 
nondiscriminatory alternatives.’ Our cases require that 
justifications for discriminatory restrictions on commerce 
pass the ‘strictest scrutiny.’ The State’s burden of 
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define “strictest scrutiny,” but strict scrutiny of any legitimate 
purpose is at best an oxymoron like “virtual reality” or perhaps 
even “virtually per se,”223 and at worst a test inconsistent with 
its purpose.  “Strict scrutiny” usually refers to the “compelling 
state interest” test.  Nonetheless, the Court has never actually 
used the “compelling state interest” test as the standard of 
scrutiny in any Dormant Commerce Clause case.  Even in Pike, 
which did use the phrase, the Court only referred to the fact that 
a “more compelling state interest” might have offset the harm to 
interstate commerce; it did not say that such a test was required. 
  In New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach224 Justice Scalia 
for the Court gave different inconsistent versions of the test for 
discrimination.  In Limbach, Ohio had a tax on all fuels, but 
exempted ethanol made from Ohio corn or corn from a state that 
had a reciprocity agreement with Ohio.  The Court rejected 
Ohio’s claim that it was not discriminating, but only encouraging 
 
justification is so heavy that ’facial discrimination by itself 
may be a fatal defect.’ 
 
Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 456 (1992); Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. 
Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 342–43 (1992) (citations omitted) (The Court also said, 
“Because the additional fee discriminates both on its face and in practical 
effect, the burden falls on the State ‘to justify it both in terms of the local 
benefits flowing from the statute and the unavailability of nondiscriminatory 
alternatives adequate to preserve the local interests at stake.’”); New Energy 
Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 274–75 (1988) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (citations omitted) (“More recently, we characterized a Nebraska 
reciprocity requirement for the export of ground water from the State as 
facially discriminatory legislation which merited strictest scrutiny.”); Camps 
Newfound/Owatonna is the most recent majority opinion in a Supreme Court 
Dormant Commerce Clause case to use the “strictest scrutiny” language.  Five 
Supreme Court cases since Camps Newfound/Owatonna cited to Hughes but 
do not use the term “strictest scrutiny.” See Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers 
Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449 (2019); South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. 
Ct. 2080, 2089 (2018); Comptroller of Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 
1787, 1794 (2015); Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 338 (2008); 
Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 472 (2005) (citations omitted) (“Time and 
again this Court has held that, in all but the narrowest circumstances, state 
laws violate the Commerce Clause if they mandate ‘differential treatment of 
in-state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and 
burdens the latter.’  This rule is essential to the foundations of the Union.”).  
223. Professor Regan calls the phrase “mildly oxymoronic.”  Regan, supra 
note 34, at 1134. 
224. New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 274 (1988) 
(citations omitted). 
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free trade by waiving its tax on any state that gave the same 
advantages to Ohio-produced ethanol that it gave to ethanol of 
the reciprocating state.225  The Court said that a state could not 
use reciprocal requirements as a “‘threat of economic isolation as 
a weapon to force sister States to enter into even a desirable 
reciprocity agreement.’”226  The Court cited Sporhase v. 
Nebraska as finding a state reciprocity requirement facially 
discriminatory legislation, which merited “strictest scrutiny.”227 
Justice Scalia initially gave a strongly protective statement 
of the Court’s approach, “Thus, state statutes that clearly 
discriminate against interstate commerce are routinely struck 
down unless the discrimination is demonstrably justified by a 
valid factor unrelated to economic protectionism.”  This would 
be basically a per se approach. In Justice Scalia’s summary, the 
justification had to be “unrelated to economic protectionism” a 
much narrower justification than Hughes’ “some purported 
legitimate purpose.”  Justice Scalia then qualified this protective 
statement and stated a “virtually per se balancing” test; “Our 
cases leave open the possibility that a State may validate a 
statute that discriminates against interstate commerce by 
showing that it advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot 
be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory 
alternatives.”228  Justice Scalia hedged his bets moving from a 
 
225. The Court acknowledged that Indiana discriminated in favor of 
Indiana companies by giving a cash subsidy to those that used Indiana corn for 
ethanol, but it said that a state could advantage local residents as long as it 
did not regulate interstate commerce, “Direct subsidization of domestic 
industry does not ordinarily run afoul of that prohibition; discriminatory 
taxation of out-of-state manufacturers does.” Id. at 278.  But even if Indiana’s 
subsidy violated the Commerce Clause, “retaliatory violation of the Commerce 
Clause by Ohio would not be acceptable.” Id.  The Court’s message was clear; 
the remedy for violations of the Dormant Commerce Clause was to seek redress 
from the courts, not through retaliatory self-help measures.  The implicit 
purpose of the Commerce Clause was to prevent such internal economic 
warfare. 
226. Id. at 274 (quoting Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 
U.S. 366, 379 (1976)) as to Mississippi’s requirement for the sale of Louisiana 
milk in Mississippi).   
227. Id. at 274–75 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sporhase 
v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 958 (1982)).   
228. Id. at 278 (citations omitted).  Justice Thomas quotes this language 
and applies it in Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of State of Or., 
511 U.S. 93, 100–01 (1994).  
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“per se” test to the cop-out “our cases leave open,” and he gave a 
version of a balancing that was very similar to Dean Milk.229  
Justice Scalia then referred to all of the standard discrimination 
tropes—“simple economic protectionism” “a virtually per se rule 
of invalidity,” “a fatal defect,” and “strictest scrutiny”—tropes all 
inconsistent with a balancing approach. 
In his balancing, Justice Scalia easily rejected both Ohio’s 
health and commerce rationales for their discriminatory 
exemptions.  As for health, assuming ethanol was healthier than 
regular gasoline, ethanol from Indiana corn was no less healthy 
than from Ohio corn.230  And as for commerce, the law did not 
encourage favorable treatment of ethanol generally, “but only 
favorable treatment for Ohio-produced ethanol.”231  And in 
typical Justice Scalia fashion, his conclusion approached 
scathing, “In sum, appellees’ health and commerce justifications 
amount to no more than implausible speculation, which does not 
suffice to validate this plain discrimination against products of 
out-of-state manufacture.”232 
 
D.  How did the Court come to both a per se and a balancing test 
in discrimination cases? 
 
The Court’s use of phrases like “virtually per se,” “fatal 
defect” and “strictest scrutiny,” all seem like a death sentence for 
discrimination against interstate commerce, and indeed they 
may be in that the Court almost universally strikes down such 
state laws.  Nonetheless, as noted above in some detail, the 
Court has variously stated its specific rule against 
discrimination.  The Court’s attempt to define what “virtually 
per se” might mean has led to inconsistent results.  The Court’s 
approach has morphed from “strictest scrutiny” to what seems 
like at most an intermediate test. 
The first test, and the easiest to apply, is the per se 
approach.  Under the per se approach, when discrimination is 
proven, the law is invalid.  There is no defending discrimination, 
except by a form of strict scrutiny, that is, by showing that it was 
 
229. As discussed elsewhere, Justice Scalia at this point then suggested 
that maybe a law that passed this test was not discriminatory at all.  
230. New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 279 (1988). 
231. Id. at 280. 
232. Id. 
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not based upon origin or economic protectionism.  The 
requirement of Philadelphia v. New Jersey that discrimination 
must be justified by something “apart from origin”233 and 
Limbach’s holding that it had to be “justified by a valid factor 
unrelated to economic protectionism”234 seems to capture the 
strict scrutiny required for discrimination.  The per se approach 
should inherently include the “origin” or “economic 
protectionism” approach.  But, if the discrimination is shown to 
be unrelated to origin or economic discrimination, it also seems 
to be a way of saying that discrimination did not exist.  If the 
basis of the state’s classification is “apart from origin” or 
“unrelated to economic protectionism,” then it is not 
discriminatory.  If New York kept out Pennsylvania dairy cattle 
in Mintz because of the fear of Bang’s disease, the law was not 
discriminatory.  Or if it was discriminatory because only out of 
state cattle was excluded, then the discrimination did not violate 
the Commerce Clause because Pennsylvania cattle was not 
excluded because of its origin nor because of economic 
protectionism but because the cattle was diseased.  This is the 
“Catch 22” of the per se approach.  The Dormant Commerce 
Clause forbids discrimination based upon origin or economic 
protectionism.  If a state law that seems to discriminate against 
origin is shown to be related to something other than origin or 
economic protectionism, it is not discriminatory. In short, 
discrimination is not allowed unless it is shown to be 
nondiscriminatory. 
The second approach is the “virtually per se balancing” test.  
In these cases, the Court states some version of a low-level 
intermediate test.235  An example of this is Sporhase v. 
 
233. City of Phila. v.  New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626–27 (1978) (“But 
whatever New Jersey’s ultimate purpose, it may not be accomplished by 
discriminating against articles of commerce coming from outside the State 
unless there is some reason, apart from their origin, to treat them 
differently.”).  
234. Limbach, 486 U.S. at 274 (“Thus, state statutes that clearly 
discriminate against interstate commerce are routinely struck down unless the 
discrimination is demonstrably justified by a valid factor unrelated to 
economic protectionism.”).  
235. Dean Milk is the beginning of this approach. The Court in Dean Milk 
said that a state could not discriminate “if reasonable nondiscriminatory 
alternatives, adequate to conserve legitimate local interests, are available.” 
Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, Wisc., 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951).  This rule 
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Nebraska236 where the Court found that a Colorado reciprocity 
requirement for the use of groundwater was a facially 
discriminatory burden on interstate commerce.  The Court said 
that Colorado had failed to show that the burden was “a close 
fit,”237 “narrowly tailored”238 or even that it “significantly 
advances the State’s legitimate conservation and preservation 
interest.”239  There is a bit of a mixed message here, but the 
 
was modestly tweaked in Hunt v. Washington State Apple, which required the 
state to justify discrimination, “both in terms of the local benefits flowing from 
the statute and the unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate 
to preserve the local interests at stake.” Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adv. 
Comm’n., 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977).  The Court in Maine v. Taylor, echoing 
Dean Milk, said that discriminatory laws had to “‘serve a legitimate local 
purpose’” and that “this purpose could not be served as well by available 
nondiscriminatory means.” Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986).  In 
Limbach, the Court referred to a reformulated Dean Milk test when Limbach 
said that the Court’s prior cases left open the possibility that a state might 
justify discrimination “by showing that it advances a legitimate local purpose 
that cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory 
alternatives.” Limbach, 486 U.S. at 278.  The Court in C & A Carbone, Inc. v. 
Town of Clarkstown, N.Y., 511 U.S. 383, 392 (1994), dropped the adverb 
“virtually” but nonetheless made the per se test conditional, “Discrimination 
against interstate commerce in favor of local business or investment is per 
se invalid, save in a narrow class of cases in which the municipality can 
demonstrate, under rigorous scrutiny, that it has no other means to advance a 
legitimate local interest.”  Professor Smith restates the Dean Milk test, stating 
that: 
  
It is settled Supreme Court doctrine that if a regulation is 
discriminatory, the state bears the burden of justifying it. 
First, the state must prove that it has a legitimate interest to 
be served by the regulation. Second, it must show that the 
regulation serves this interest to a substantial extent. Third, 
it must prove that it has no available alternatives to the 
regulation that are less discriminatory.   
 
Smith, supra note 150, at 1231.  
236. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941(1982).  
237. Id. at 957 (“The State therefore bears the initial burden of 
demonstrating a close fit between the reciprocity requirement and its asserted 
local purpose.”).  
238. Id. at 957–58. 
239. Id. at 958. “Narrowly tailored” is part of the standard statement of 
the compelling state interest test. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 135 S. Ct. 
2218, 2226 (2015) (“Content-based laws—those that target speech based on its 
communicative content—are presumptively unconstitutional and may be 
justified only if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve 
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latter part of the test is not strict scrutiny.  “Significantly 
advances” the State’s “legitimate interest” reads more like a low-
level intermediate test.240  “Significantly advances” is essentially 
the same as “substantially related” as used in the intermediate 
gender test.241 “Legitimate interest” is the same as “permissible 
interest” used in rational basis permissive review cases.242  
Significantly advances legitimate interest is what I call a “soft” 
intermediate test.  The Sporhase test is essentially the same as 
the one the Court uses in equal protection cases involving 
classifications based upon legitimacy of birth.  The Court has 
specifically said, “[C]lassifications based on illegitimacy are not 
subject to ‘strict scrutiny,’ they nevertheless are invalid under 
the Fourteenth Amendment if they are not substantially related 
to permissible state interests.”243  It is a “soft” intermediate test 
 
compelling state interests.”).  “Close fit” is a less common phrase than narrowly 
tailored, but the Court has used it as a synonym for “narrowly tailored.” 
McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 486 (2014) (“But by demanding 
a close fit between ends and means, the tailoring requirement prevents the 
government from too readily ‘sacrific[ing] speech for efficiency.”) McCullen 
used the “narrowly tailored” language in a content-neutral free speech case 
involving intermediate scrutiny.  The Court has also used the term “close fit” 
to exclude the compelling state interest test.  Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 
401, 411 (1989).  In a case involving prisoner rights, the Court said a close fit 
was required but not the “least restrictive test” used in compelling state 
interest cases. 
240. Limbach continued the Court’s mixed messages. It said that laws 
that “clearly discriminate . . . are routinely struck down” but then it qualified 
what would seem a fatal defect with “unless the discrimination is demonstrably 
justified by a valid factor unrelated to economic protectionism.” Limbach, 486 
U.S. at 273 (citations omitted).  Later even this was qualified; “Our cases leave 
open the possibility that a State may validate a statute that discriminates 
against interstate commerce by showing that it advances a legitimate local 
purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory 
alternatives.” Id. at 278 (emphasis added). 
241. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (“To withstand 
constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender 
must serve important governmental objectives and must 
be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.”).  
242. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 407 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting) (“[U]nder the Due Process Clause it need only be shown that it 
bears a rational relation to a constitutionally permissible objective.”).  See 
Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Jim’s Motorcycle, Inc., 401 F.3d 560, 569 (4th 
Cir. 2005), which applied the “rational basis” test in resolving the “legitimate” 
state end portion of the Dormant Commerce Clause test. 
243. Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 265 (1978) (emphasis added).  
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because the Court mixes elements of an intermediate test with 
elements of a rational basis test, which is permissive scrutiny.  
The Court in Lalli used the “substantially related” part of the 
intermediate test from gender cases.  And it used “permissible 
state ends,” which is synonymous with “legitimate” state ends 
typically used in rational basis cases.  The Court in the 2019 
case, Tennessee Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas,244 
seems to have confirmed that “soft” intermediate test.  It said 
concisely that a state law discriminating against interstate 
commerce would be sustained only on a showing that it was 
“narrowly tailored to advance a legitimate local purpose.” 
The “virtually per se balancing” test used in the 
discrimination cases is not remarkably different, if at all, from 
the Court’s undue burdens balancing test used in cases not 
involving discrimination.245  The widely quoted Pike version of 
the undue burdens balancing test upholds evenhanded burdens 
on interstate commerce “unless the burden imposed on such 
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local 
benefits.”  The Pike Court itself applied its balancing test to 
strike down what was an obviously discriminatory law, no 
matter the state’s claim of a legitimate state interest.  The Dean 
Milk version emphasizes that there must not be “reasonable 
nondiscriminatory alternatives” while the Pike undue burdens 
balancing test provides that whether the local interest “could be 
promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities” is 
part of the balancing test.  There is little apparent difference 
between “lesser impact” of evenhanded burdens and “reasonable 
alternatives” as to discriminatory burdens.  It is not clear that 
the language of Court’s most common statements of the 
“virtually per se balancing” test in its discrimination cases, adds 
much to the Southern Pacific or Pike undue burdens balancing 
test, but in actual operation, no matter how the Court states the 
test in a discrimination case, the state law is likely to be struck 
down. 
 
 
244. Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449, 
2461 (2019) (internal quotations and brackets omitted). 
245. See the observation by the Fourth Circuit in Colon Health Centers of 
Am., LLC v. Hazel, 733 F.3d 535, 547 (4th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he factual material 
relevant to the Pike standard largely overlaps with evidence germane to the 
discrimination test.”).  
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E. Discriminatory purposes, means, and effects 
 
One of the complexities that the Court has added to its 
discrimination cases is that the Court says that it will find a law 
discriminatory if the purpose,246 the means of accomplishing the 
purpose,247 or the law’s effects248 are discriminatory.249  If a 
discriminatory purpose were found, that would normally be 
conclusively fatal.250  Discriminatory means are a little more 
ambiguous but are almost certainly fatal as well.  Perhaps the 
best example of discriminatory means is Philadelphia v. New 
Jersey.  The state of New Jersey may very well have had a 
nondiscriminatory environmental purpose in protecting landfills 
 
246. Cases in which the State “artlessly discloses an avowed purpose to 
discriminate against interstate goods” demonstrates the Court’s most obvious 
form of forbidden discrimination against interstate commerce. Dean Milk Co. 
v. City of Madison, Wis., 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951). 
247. City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (“[T]he evil of 
protectionism can reside in legislative means as well as legislative ends.”); See 
also Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 271 (1984) (“No one disputes 
that a State may enact laws pursuant to its police powers that have the 
purpose and effect of encouraging domestic industry. However, the Commerce 
Clause stands as a limitation on the means by which a State can 
constitutionally seek to achieve that goal.”).  In Hunt v. Wash. State Apple 
Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 352–53 (1977), the Court said that it “need not 
ascribe an economic protection motive” because the state law singled out “the 
very means by which apples are transported in commerce.”  
248. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 270 (1984) (citations 
omitted)(“A finding that state legislation constitutes “economic protectionism” 
may be made on the basis of either discriminatory purpose, or discriminatory 
effect.”). See also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979), where the 
Court refers to laws that “discriminates against interstate commerce either on 
its face or in practical effect.”; Bacchus 468 U.S. at 273 (“We therefore conclude 
that the Hawaii liquor tax exemption for okolehao and pineapple wine violated 
the Commerce Clause because it had both the purpose and effect of 
discriminating in favor of local products.”). 
249. Professor Zebot’s frustration is clear, “The courts have taken a 
woefully dysfunctional approach to the discriminatory purpose prong of the 
current dormant Commerce Clause analysis.” Julian Cyril Zebot, Awakening 
A Sleeping Dog: An Examination of the Confusion in Ascertaining Purposeful 
Discrimination Against Interstate Commerce, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1063, 1094 
(2002). Professor Eule prefers the term “disproportionalism rather than 
discrimination.” Eule, supra note 104, at 460.   
250. Although the Court will often refer to “facial” discrimination, the 
fatal purpose to discriminate can be found in other ways.  See Dean Milk Co., 
340 U.S. at 354, where the Court makes it clear that discrimination is not 
limited to some purpose the state “artlessly discloses.” 
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within the state.  But it chose a means that excluded all out of 
state waste and allowed all in-state waste; the means were 
discriminatory.  Discriminatory means are actually the easiest 
type of discrimination for the Court to find.  When the state 
describes the evil they are trying to prevent and offers an 
explanation as to why out of state commerce is treated 
differently in addressing that evil, but the explanation does not 
go to how out of state is a peculiar source of that evil, the 
exclusion of out of state commerce as a means is discriminatory.  
Sure, overreaching in selling financial products is an evil, but 
there is no reason to believe that out of state bankers are 
peculiar sources of overreaching.251  Sure, hazardous wastes in 
landfills present serious problems to every states’ economy, but 
out of state hazardous waste is not a peculiar source of those 
evils.252 
Discriminatory effects are the most problematic.253  The fact 
 
251. See Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27 (1980). 
252. Justice Thomas offered this advice in Oregon Waste Systems: 
 
At the outset, we note two justifications that respondents 
have not presented. No claim has been made that the 
disposal of waste from other States imposes higher costs on 
Oregon and its political subdivisions than the disposal of in-
state waste. Also, respondents have not offered any safety or 
health reason unique to nonhazardous waste from other 
States for discouraging the flow of such waste into Oregon. 
 
Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of State of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 101 
(1994) (citations omitted). And he explained the importance of this absence:  
 
Of course, if out-of-state waste did impose higher costs on 
Oregon than in-state waste, Oregon could recover the 
increased cost through a differential charge on out-of-state 
waste, for then there would be a reason, apart from its origin, 
why solid waste coming from outside the State should be 
treated differently.   
 
Id. at 101, n.5 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (brackets 
omitted). Oregon was unable to defend its claim that the higher surcharge for 
out of state waste was compensatory for the additional cost that in state 
companies paid in general taxes. Id.  
253. Perhaps the best case emphasizing the importance of effect is 
Comptroller of Treasury of Md.  v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015) (Maryland in 
the application of its personal income tax failed to give full credit for income 
taxes paid by its residents for income earned in other states. Maryland argued 
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that a state law happens to have a disproportionate impact or 
effect on interstate commerce does not alone make it 
discriminatory.254  As was the case in Southern Pacific, eighty-
five percent of overlong freight trains were interstate.  This 
disparate effect on interstate commerce led the Court to say that 
the political processes within the state would not likely protect 
against abuses, but this was only one of the factors in the Court’s 
undue burdens approach.  It did not lead the Court to say that 
the state law was discriminatory.255 
In its equal protection cases, the Court makes a clear 
distinction between discriminatory racial purposes and 
disproportionate racial effects, with only discriminatory racial 
purposes being subject to the compelling state interest test.256  
Disproportionate racial effects had to pass only the rational 
basis test.257  The reason for the distinction between racially 
 
it could adopt any tax scheme, because it did not intend to purposely 
discriminate.  The Court’s rejection of that logic was firm, “The Commerce 
Clause regulates effects, not motives, and it does not require courts to inquire 
into voters’ or legislators’ reasons for enacting a law that has a discriminatory 
effect.” Id. at 1803 n.4 (citations omitted)).  
254. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 617–18 
(1981) where the Court rejected the claim that Montana’s severance tax on coal 
was discriminatory “because 90% of Montana coal is shipped to other States 
under contracts that shift the tax burden primarily to non-Montana utility 
companies and thus to citizens of other States.” The Court said that both the 
tax rate and the way it was administered were even-handed based upon the 
amount of coal consumed. Id. 
255. Cf. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) (the Court upheld a 
California raisin brokerage scheme which its purpose and effect was to obtain 
higher prices from out of state purchasers of California grown raisins). 
256. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (“But our cases have 
not embraced the proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to 
whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely 
because it has a racially disproportionate impact.” Calling purposes 
“discriminatory” and effects “disproportionate” is common, but 
“disproportionate” is just another way of saying “discriminatory.”  What is 
important is that racially discriminatory effects are treated differently than 
racially discriminatory purposes, with only the latter getting the strict scrutiny 
of the compelling state interest test). 
257. In Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 545 (1972) a Texas welfare 
law gave one-hundred percent of determined need to the aged and seventy-five 
percent of determined need to those receiving Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC). Because persons receiving AFDC were disproportionately 
racial minorities, the law had a racially disproportionate effect. Id. The Court 
held, “So long as its judgments are rational, and not invidious, the legislature’s 
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discriminatory purposes and racially disproportionate effects is 
fairly obvious.  A racially discriminatory purpose was 
overwhelming proof of racial hostility inconsistent with equal 
protection rights.  A racially disproportionate effect might be 
found in the most innocent of laws, one wholly unrelated to any 
thought of race, let alone of racial hostility.  A law raising the 
price of food stamps might have as its purpose providing benefits 
to a greater number of low-income persons.  That would 
certainly be a valid purpose, but given the racial gap in our 
economic system, it would be common knowledge that any 
increase in cost might very well have a disproportionate racial 
impact.  Disproportionate effects in equal protection cases, 
however, are not an irrelevancy.  The racially disproportionate 
effect of a law, particularly a stark difference in effect,258  would 
be evidence of a racially discriminatory purpose.259 
The Court has adopted no such rule for laws with an 
 
efforts to tackle the problems of the poor and the needy are not subject to a 
constitutional straitjacket.” Id. at 546.  
258. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886), where all 200 
Chinese with wooden laundries were denied a permit to continue operations 
and all 80 whites with wooden laundries were granted a permit. The Court 
found, 
  
The fact of this discrimination is admitted. No reason for it is 
shown, and the conclusion cannot be resisted that no reason 
for it exists except hostility to the race and nationality to 
which the petitioners belong, and which, in the eye of the law, 
is not justified. The discrimination is therefore illegal, and 
the public administration which enforces it is a denial of the 
equal protection of the laws, and a violation of the fourteenth 
amendment of the constitution.  
Id.  
259. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976), (“Necessarily, an 
invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the 
relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the law bears more heavily 
on one race than another.”).  Accord Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. 
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977), (“Sometimes a clear pattern, 
unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from the effect of the state 
action even when the governing legislation appears neutral on its face.  The 
evidentiary inquiry is then relatively easy.13 But such cases are rare. Absent a 
pattern as stark as that in Gomillion [v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960)] or Yick 
Wo, impact alone is not determinative, and the Court must look to other 
evidence.”).  
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economically disproportionate effect on interstate commerce.260  
And perhaps it does not need to. In equal protection cases, the 
distinction between discriminatory purposes and effects is the 
difference between the compelling state interest test and the 
rational basis test.  In the Dormant Commerce Clause cases, the 
difference between what would likely be a “virtually per se 
balancing” test and undue burdens would be marginal at best.  
There is no easy way to distinguish a Dormant Commerce 
Clause case that the Court calls a discriminatory effect that is 
virtually per se invalid—but then only subject to an 
intermediate test—and one with disproportionate effect that will 
only get an undue burdens balancing test.  But in most instances 
nothing much turns on the difference. 
Dean Milk introduced the discriminatory effect into the 
discussion of discrimination. One can see its appeal.  If a law is 
not discriminatory on its face, then it is very hard to determine 
discrimination.  The fact of discrimination in Dean Milk was 
obvious, because none of Madison’s nondiscriminatory 
explanations made any sense. The Court should have called it 
what it was, purposeful discrimination.  It is not that Madison’s 
exclusion of out of state milk was discriminatory in effect, rather 
it was discriminatory in its purpose, and Madison was clearly 
lying as to some neutral purpose. Despite the fact that the 
statement of the effect portion is difficult at best, when the Court 
believes that a state is fabricating its reasons for discriminating, 
ultimately it does not matter if the Court calls that a 
discriminatory purpose, a discriminatory means, or a 
discriminatory effect.  In most of these types of cases, the Court 
 
260. Following the pattern of the equal protection cases and racially 
discriminatory effect, Professor Regan argues that under the Dormant 
Commerce Clause state laws should be protectionist only if they have a 
protectionist purpose, that protectionist effect is only evidence of a 
protectionist purpose,  “We can of course define the phrase ‘protectionist effect,’ 
and it will be useful to do so: a protectionist effect is any improvement (caused 
by the statute) in the competitive position of some class of local economic actors 
vis-à-vis their foreign competitors. But protectionist effect does not make a 
statute protectionist under my definition; nor does protectionist effect have 
any constitutional significance in itself. The Court both is and should be 
concerned with purpose. Protectionist effect is significant evidence on the issue 
of protectionist purpose; but it is just that, evidence and no more.” 
Regan, supra note 34, at 1095. 
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hopefully knows it when it sees it.261  Maine v. Taylor may be an 
exception to that hope. 
The rules against discrimination would be infinitely easier 
if the Court adopted a strict “per se” test and if the Court were 
more willing to find that state laws were purposefully 
discriminatory, whatever the state’s claimed justification.  Still, 
the Court applies its discriminatory rules in such a protective 
way that for the most part the purposes of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause in protecting our national economy are 
fulfilled. 
 
F. The factually difficult cases in finding discrimination 
 
In most cases, no matter how the Court finds it, 
discrimination is clear.  In a few cases, discrimination against 
interstate commerce is not easy to determine.  In 1877, in one of 
the very first Dormant Commerce Clause cases finding a state 
law discriminatory, the Court in Hannibal & St. J.R. Co. v. 
Husen262  found that a Missouri law, which effectively excluded 
Texas, Mexican, and Indian cattle from being off-loaded in 
Missouri during two-thirds of the year, was in violation of the 
dormant commerce clause because of its discrimination against 
interstate commerce: “The object and effect of the statute are, 
therefore, to obstruct inter-state commerce, and to discriminate 
between the property of citizens of one State and that of citizens 
of other States.”263  The Court just as recently as its current term 
referred to Husen as an example of the State imposing 
“protectionist measures clothed as police-power regulations.”264  
But was it? Twelve years later in Kimmish v. Ball265  the Court 
upheld an Iowa law that barred the importation of “Texas 
cattle,” including Mexican and Indian cattle, that had not 
wintered north of Kansas’ and Missouri’s southern border.  
Effectively, the Iowa law excluded cattle in the same way as the 
 
261. Any attempt to explain a rule which references Justice Stewart’s 
famous comment in the pornography case, Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 
(1964), may illustrate the bankruptcy of the intended explanation. 
262. Hannibal & St. J.R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465 (1877). 
263. Id. at 470. 
264. Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449, 
2468 (2019). 
265. Kimmish v. Ball, 129 U.S. 217 (1889). 
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Missouri law, but the Court viewed it as a valid health and 
safety measure.  Texas cattle had fleas that carried destructive 
diseases, but the fleas were killed off if the cattle wintered in 
colder climes.266  Although Husen was distinguished on the 
grounds that Missouri had failed to argue that it was only 
excluding diseased cattle,267  both the Missouri and Iowa laws 
were in all likelihood valid regulations of a local concern and not 
simply discrimination against interest commerce. 
In Mintz v. Baldwin268  in 1933, it was hard to know whether 
the state had a legitimate concern for diseased cattle or whether 
it was protecting local dairy farmers from additional 
competition.  In Mintz, the Court allowed New York to ban out 
of state cattle with Bang’s disease out of concern for the spread 
of a disease of dairy cattle that affected the quality of their 
milk.269  The Court accepted the findings of the lower court, 
stating, “Bang’s disease prevails throughout the United States, 
and is one of the greatest limiting factors, both as to 
reproduction and milk yield.”  But it may have been just as likely 
that New York was trying to protect New York dairy farmers 
from competition from out of state farmers.270  This is evidenced 
 
266. Id. (the Court mentions only disease, not the role of the fleas in 
spreading it). 
267. Id.  
268. Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346 (1933). 
269. The dissenting judge in the lower court was less sure about New 
York’s good faith:  
 
True, there is inspection provided by state law for New York 
state cattle, but there is no requirement in such inspection 
that to be sold in the state they shall come from a herd, all of 
whose members are free from Bang’s disease. The October 
order requires this of imported cattle but not of domestic 
cattle.   
 
Mintz v. Baldwin, 2 F. Supp. 700, 715 (N.D.N.Y. 1933) (Cooper, J., dissenting).  
270. There is a bevy of cases illustrating New York’s concern about the 
oversupply of milk in New York, so certainly New York had the motive to 
exclude additional competition from out of state dairy cattle. The most famous 
of the “Milk Law” cases are Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935), 
and H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949). In Seelig, the 
Court struck down a New York law that fixed the minimum price to be paid for 
in state and out of state farmers for their milk. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511. In Hood 
& Sons, the Court found that New York’s area distribution centers for the sale 
of milk illegally favored New York regions over out of state areas, such as 
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by the fact that New York had stricter requirements for 
inspection of out of state cattle than in state cattle.  The twenty 
head of Wisconsin cattle involved in the controversy had been 
certified free of Bang’s disease, but New York required that out 
of state cattle but not in state cattle come from herds certified 
free of Bang’s disease.271  This could easily have been viewed as 
discriminatory. In Maine v. Taylor, the Court found the law 
discriminatory but allowed the state of Maine to bar the 
importation of golden shiners, a type of minnow, from 
neighboring states out of the State’s claimed concerns for the 
spread of parasitic diseases and the spread of nonnative 
species.272  In the case, Justice Stevens, in his dissenting opinion, 
saw “something fishy about this case.”273  The golden shiners 
barred from import already shared the interstate streams of 
New England with Maine golden shiners. Justice Stephens may 
have believed that there was little chance of any additional harm 
from additional importation.274 
In Mintz v. Baldwin, the New York ban on the importation 
of cattle with Bang’s disease fell entirely out of state, but the law 
was not viewed as discriminatory either as to its purpose or 
effect because the Court, rightly or wrongly, believed that the 
purpose of the law was to protect interstate commerce from 
something dangerous in other states.  Interstate commerce was 
not being discriminated against because it was interstate 
commerce but because it presented a greater danger. 
In Maine v. Taylor, Maine’s ban on the importation of golden 
shiners because of the increased danger of disease and invasive 
species was viewed as discriminatory but nonetheless 
constitutional because of the threat from out of state Golden 
Shiners.  But if Maine was correct that out of state golden 
shiners presented a unique danger to Maine, then, like Mintz, 
 
Boston, Massachusetts. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 336 U.S. 525. In both cases, 
New York was trying to provide a remedy for the excess supplies of milk, which 
was driving down the price that New York farmers received. 
271. Mintz, 2 F. Supp. at 706 (Cooper, J., dissenting).  
272. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 142–43 (1986). 
273. Id. at 152 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
274. In GMC v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278 (1997), the Court concluded that out 
of state natural gas companies sold something different than in state and thus 
could be subject to a higher tax.  Justice Stevens in dissent thought that part 
of the market was the same and found invalid discrimination as to that part of 
the market.  Id. at 313 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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the law was not discriminatory.  The Court made this distinction 
in Philadelphia v. New Jersey in talking about quarantine laws, 
“It is true that certain quarantine laws have not been considered 
forbidden protectionist measures, even though they were 
directed against out-of-state commerce. . .  Those laws thus did 
not discriminate against interstate commerce as such, but 
simply prevented traffic in noxious articles, whatever their 
origin.”275  Even though the full impact of a valid quarantine law 
fell out of state, it was not discriminatory because out of state 
was not being treated differently because of origin, but because 
it was the unique source of the noxious article being forbidden.  
Another way of putting it is that discriminatory state laws are 
per se invalid, unless interstate commerce is different in some 
way that justifies the discrimination, in which case the law is 
not in fact discriminatory.  In those cases, interstate commerce 
is being discriminated against, not because it is interstate, but 
because it is different.  Justice Scalia made the same point, that 
discrimination might be justified if it advanced a legitimate local 
purpose that could not be addressed by some reasonable 
nondiscriminatory purpose, but that, he said, was “perhaps just 
another way of saying that what may appear to be a 
‘discriminatory’ provision in the constitutionally prohibited 
sense—that is, a protectionist enactment—may on closer 
analysis not be so.”276 
In Exxon v. Maryland,277  the full impact of the law fell on 
interstate commerce but it was not found to be discriminatory.  
A Maryland statute provided that refiners of gasoline could not 
operate any retail service station within the state of Maryland.  
This compelled divestiture between refiners and dealers of 
gasoline was passed during a time of fuel shortage.  The State 
was trying to prevent refiners, all of them out of state, from 
favoritism towards their own service stations during this time of 
 
275. City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 628–29 (1978) (citations 
omitted). 
276. New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 274 (1988) 
(citations omitted). Justice Thomas quotes this language and applies it in Or. 
Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of State of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 100–01 
(1994) (“As a result, the surcharge must be invalidated unless respondents can 
‘sho[w] that it advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately 
served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.’”).  
277. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 119 (1978). 
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shortage, which was thought to be destructive of competition.278  
Refiner-owned service stations made up five percent of the total 
number of service stations.279  Not a single refiner of gasoline 
was located in Maryland.  The full impact of the law fell on 
interstate companies. The Court rejected the claim of 
discrimination.  There was, it said, no discrimination between in 
state and out of state refiners because there were no Maryland 
refiners of gasoline before or after the law.  There was no 
discrimination between out of state owners of service stations 
and in state owners because most out of state owners of 
Maryland service stations were not impacted by the law in that 
they were not also refiners.  The Court said that although the 
refiners were disadvantaged, “in-state independent dealers will 
have no competitive advantage over out-of-state dealers.”280  The 
fact that the burden fell “on some interstate companies does not, 
by itself, establish a claim of discrimination against interstate 
commerce.”281  In short, there was no burden whatsoever on out 
of state independent dealers and in state independent dealers, 
only on refinery-operated dealers who happen to be out of state.  
The Court said that the Commerce Clause did not protect, “the 
particular structure or methods of operation in a retail market,” 
that is, independent dealers versus refiner affiliated dealers.282  
Only Justice Blackman thought that the Maryland law was 
discriminatory.283  Exxon illustrates that even when a burden 
 
278. Id. at 121 (“The Maryland statute is an outgrowth of the 1973 
shortage of petroleum.  . . . The results of [a State] survey indicated that 
gasoline stations operated by producers or refiners had received preferential 
treatment during the period of short supply.”).  
279. Id. at 123. 
280. Id. at 126. 
281. Id. 
282. It might be noted that the five percent ownership figure by out of 
state refineries cuts both ways. On the one hand, the law did not hurt most 
service stations owned by interstate companies. On the other hand, there was 
little evidence that favoritism by interstate companies who owned only five 
percent of the dealers would actually impact competition very much, or at least 
that could not be addressed with less discriminatory measures than a complete 
ban. 
283. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland,437 U.S. 117, 135 (1978) 
(Blackman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The effect is to 
protect in-state retail service station dealers from the competition of the out-
of-state businesses. This protectionist discrimination is not justified by any 
legitimate state interest that cannot be vindicated by more evenhanded 
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falls entirely out of state,284  it is not necessarily 
discriminatory.285 
The problem with the Court’s approach to discrimination is 
not primarily the difficulty of determining if any particular state 
law is discriminatory.  Cases like Mintz and Maine v. Taylor, 
where the facts are inconclusive as to whether or not the law was 
invalid discrimination, are not the norm.  The norm is the case 
where state discrimination is blatant and the invalid purpose 
obvious, but the Court refuses to see it. 
 
V. Does it matter that there is no consistent definition or 
treatment of discrimination? 
 
To some degree, it does not matter that the Supreme Court 
uses inconsistent tests in resolving Dormant Commerce Clause 
cases involving discrimination.  First, it does not matter because 
discrimination is just the threshold test that has to be satisfied; 
the Court always has a back-up test.  Even if a law is found to 
not be discriminatory or just assumed to not be, the law still has 
to pass the Southern Pacific or Pike balancing test, which is by 
itself an effective means of protecting interstate commerce.286  
And in the balancing test, the Court considers the nature of the 
state interest with anti-competitive laws, even if not 
discriminatory, being given lesser weight because of their 
nature.  To the degree that the balancing test has fallen out of 
 
regulation.”).  Professor Smith calls the reasoning of the Exxon Court as to 
discrimination “abhorrent.” Smith, supra note 150, at 1215. 
284. The law also hurt Maryland residents in that it excluded smaller out-
of-state refiners who operated high-volume, low-priced service stations in the 
state. The Court said that the harm to in-state residents went to the wisdom 
of the law, an apparent due process or equal protection issue, not the burden 
on interstate commerce. Exxon, 437 U.S. at 128.  
285. The Court in Exxon also rejected the claim that the law imposed an 
undue burden on interstate commerce. Id. 
286. See Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 353 (2008), 
concluding that “a state law does not amount to forbidden discrimination 
against interstate commerce is not the death knell of all dormant Commerce 
Clause challenges, for we generally leave the courtroom door open to plaintiffs 
invoking the rule in Pike, that even nondiscriminatory burdens on commerce 
may be struck down on a showing that those burdens clearly outweigh the 
benefits of a state or local practice.”  
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favor with certain judges,287  it has become a less good back up 
test.  Second, the results in cases involving discrimination speak 
for themselves.  In most of the cases, it does not matter in terms 
of results whether the Court applies a “per se” or a “virtually per 
se balancing” approach; discrimination is generally going to be 
struck down.288  In the dozens of discrimination cases decided by 
the Supreme Court since Southern Pacific, no matter what test 
the Court used, only one, Maine v. Taylor, upheld what the Court 
called discrimination.289  Maine v. Taylor found that there were 
 
287. See Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., 486 U.S. 
888, 897 (1988), where Justice Scalia limited his support of the balancing test 
to those cases with firm precedential support. Justice Thomas hates all of the 
Commerce Clause but especially balancing; and Justice Gorsuch has signaled 
that he shares some of Scalia’s and Thomas’ concerns about the Dormant 
Commerce Clause: 
 
My agreement with the Court’s discussion of the history of 
our dormant commerce clause jurisprudence, however, 
should not be mistaken for agreement with all aspects of the 
doctrine. The Commerce Clause is found in Article I and 
authorizes Congress to regulate interstate commerce. 
Meanwhile our dormant commerce cases suggest Article 
III courts may invalidate state laws that offend no 
congressional statute. Whether and how much of this can be 
squared with the text of the Commerce Clause, justified 
by stare decisis, or defended as misbranded products of 
federalism or antidiscrimination imperatives flowing from 
Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause are questions 
for another day. 
 
S. Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2100-01 (2018) (Gorsuch J., 
concurring). There are certainly some scholars who do not support the 
balancing test. Professor Eule does not mince words, “It no longer makes sense 
for the Court to invalidate evenhanded state legislation merely because it 
burdens interstate commerce too heavily.” Eule, supra note 104, at 436.  He 
cites both Justices Black and Douglas as having supported his view.  Id. at 436, 
n.57.  
288. See Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 456–57 (1992), where the 
Court refers to examining a “presumably legitimate goal” that turns out to be 
an “illegitimate means” of economic isolation. 
289. Professor Smith includes Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen 
v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R., 393 U.S. 129 (1968), as an example of the Court 
upholding a discriminatory law. Smith, supra note 150, at 1232, n. 164.  In the 
Brotherhood case, the Court upheld Arkansas’ “full-crew” law that fixed the 
minimum number of railroad employees that had to serve as part of the train 
crew. Id. The law had exemptions based upon mileage of track that excluded 
all in state trains but included all but one out of state train from the full-crew 
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no reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives to Maine’s 
absolute exclusion of out of state golden shiners, that only 
exclusion protected Maine’s legitimate local interest in 
preventing out of state parasites and invasive species.290 
Third, even if there is some confusion about the definition of 
discrimination or the test for justifying it, there are some 
categories of state laws that are always going to be invalid.  The 
Court in Philadelphia v. New Jersey291  listed the kinds of state 
laws found to be discriminatory: to erect “barriers to allegedly 
ruinous outside competition;” “to create jobs by keeping industry 
within the State;” “to preserve the State’s financial resources 
from depletion by fencing out indigent immigrants;” or to “accord 
its own inhabitants a preferred right of access over consumers 
in other States to natural resources located within its borders.”  
In each of these cases, a presumably legitimate goal was 
achieved by the illegitimate means of isolating the State from 
the national economy.  In Maine v. Taylor,292  the Court offered 
a general statement, “Shielding in-state industries from out-of-
state competition is almost never a legitimate local purpose.” 
In ways other than the final results, the definition of 
discrimination matters very much.  First, the degree to which 
the Court has an ambiguous or weak definition of discrimination 
encourages the states to pass discriminatory laws.  The Court 
has noted that clear rules against tariffs have led to virtually no 
states attempting to pass such tariffs.293  Second, imprecise 
 
law. Id. The Court found that the exclusions were not discriminatory since the 
length of the tracks was relevant to the need for a full-crew. See, Bhd. of 
Locomotive 393 U.S. at 141–42. Even though the Brotherhood case found no 
discrimination, Professor Smith may very well be correct in his assessment 
since the Court’s attempted justifications of the exclusions were dubious at 
best. 
290. The Court was likely correct that there was no reasonable alternative 
to absolute exclusion if out of state Golden Shiners were a threat to Maine’s 
environment, and the absence of any reasonable alternative appeared to be the 
focus of the Court’s opinion.  But the Court was likely incorrect that the state 
needed to exclude Golden Shiners at all.  Because of the intertwining nature of 
New England’s beautiful rivers, Maine Golden Shiners probably already hung 
out in all the same local hang out spots as Vermont and New Hampshire 
Golden Shiners; “Say, haven’t I seen you before?” 
291. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626–27 (1978). 
292. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 148 (1986). 
293. W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 193 (1994) (“In 
fact, tariffs against the products of other States are so patently 
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definitions lead to confusions as to all of the litigants.  Justice 
Rehnquist in a dissenting opinion in Kassel v. Consolidated 
Freightways Corp294  called the Dormant Commerce Clause 
“hopelessly confused.”  He said, “The true problem with today’s 
decision is that it gives no guidance whatsoever to these States 
as to whether their laws are valid or how to defend them.”295  Nor 
did it give any guidance to the trucking company.  His overall 
observation was almost country music like in its plaintiveness, 
“Perhaps, after all is said and done, the Court today neither says 
nor does very much at all.”296  Third, the lower courts may 
struggle to apply the appropriate test. For example, in a 2019 
case, the District Court spent almost twenty pages discussing 
what test to apply and whether state highway tolls violated the 
Dormant Commerce Clause before concluding that the Pike test 
applied and that it was not violated.297 
 
 
 
unconstitutional that our cases reveal not a single attempt by any State to 
enact one. Instead, the cases are filled with state laws that aspire to reap some 
of the benefits of tariffs by other means.”).  On the other hand, see the 
frustration of the Ninth Circuit in Nat’l Ass’n of Optometrists & Opticians v. 
Harris, 682 F.3d 1144, 1150 n.5 (9th Cir. 2012): 
 
In some cases, facial discrimination draws the line, explicitly 
or in application, between: 1) laws that are considered 
discriminatory (e.g. not “even-handed” in the words of Pike) 
and therefore subject to stricter scrutiny and virtual per 
se invalidity; and 2) other laws imposing a burden on 
interstate commerce (including laws that are discriminatory 
in purpose and effect), which are subject to the Pike “clearly 
excessive” burden test.  
294. Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  
295. Id. at 706. 
296. Id. 
297. Owner Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Tpk. 
Comm’n, 383 F. Supp. 3d 353, 367–84 (M.D. Pa. 2019). And this was a case 
where the Court said that the “factual predicates” were for the most part not 
disputed and the underlying financial records and statutory origins were “a 
matter of public record.” Nonetheless, the Court had to discern “five decades of 
slowly evolving federal law related to the dormant Commerce Clause.” Id. at 
379.  The Court observed that “the legitimacy and parameters of 
the dormant Commerce Clause are the subject of continuous vigorous debate.” 
Id.  
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VI. Conclusion 
 
The much-criticized Dormant Commerce Clause could 
partially be redeemed if the Court would just make an effort to 
simplify its approach to state discriminatory laws. The Southern 
Pacific undue burdens balancing test is as clean and neat as any 
of the other tests that the Court uses.298  Once the direct/indirect 
portion of the test is eliminated or incorporated as part of the 
balancing test, it is primarily a practical balancing of benefits to 
the state versus harm to interstate commerce.  Despite Justice 
Scalia’s claim that this is like trying to compare the length of a 
string with the heft of a rock,299 the Court is actually pretty good 
at it, and litigants are given good directions at what to 
emphasize. The key is knowing what factors are important to 
the Court in the balancing, and as early as Southern Pacific the 
Court has identified most of those factors. 
The Court’s rules with regard to discriminatory state laws 
are a different story. The cases applying a strict scrutiny per se 
approach should be the Court’s point of emphasis.  There is no 
reason that justifies any state in trying to isolate itself as to any 
economic interest from any other states.  Every state has its 
strengths and weaknesses, but it is that we stand together that 
gives us the economic power to face the increasingly 
international battle that confronts every American farmer, 
industrialist, professional, and worker.  The Court’s tendency in 
per se case to pull its punch and to suggest that discrimination 
might be justified by some inconsistently stated “virtually per se 
balancing” test just invites a state’s shortsighted attempt to 
prefer itself over other states or the United States.  We are 
stronger as a people when the Court has policies that bring us 
together as a nation.  The Court needs to call discrimination per 
se invalid and leave balancing to those evenhanded cases where 
we need to know whether a string is longer than a rock is heavy. 
 
 
298. Chen, supra note 7, at 1793. (“Dormant Commerce Clause decisions 
no more constitute a quagmire than decisions on, say, affirmative action, the 
public forum doctrine, the religion clauses, and regulatory takings. When 
difficulty of its own accord becomes an excuse for judicial and intellectual 
abdication, the Republic very well might crumble.”)  
299. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 
897 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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